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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research is to provide an analysis of the efficacy of the Joint 
Operation Planning Process (JOPP) to improve current enterprise security planning 
within the private industry.  This report will investigate predominant frameworks used 
within private industry in order to define the purpose and weaknesses of each.  The JOPP 
will be investigated to better understand what aspects may be viable for implementation 
into private industry enterprise security programs.  This information will be used to 
develop a new process called the Enterprise Security Planning Process (ESPP) that will 
illustrate the potential use of the JOPP for private industry. 
The conclusions derived through the research performed in this report are directed 
to the specific application of Department of Defense battle concepts into private industry 
security practices.  The relevance of private industry’s enterprise security programs to 
joint operation planning will be emphasized through the failures associated with the 
current business mindset of enterprise security operations.  Private industry security 
operations will be illustrated as more closely related to military conflict than business-as-
usual operations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. OVERVIEW  
This thesis will investigate the effectiveness of modeling long-range enterprise 
security planning after the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) as currently 
implemented by the Department of Defense to better equip organizations to defend 
against physical, technical, and administrative security threats.  Current enterprise 
security plans seem to fail to achieve functional viability due to a failure to: 1) understand 
that criminal- and terrorist-based attacks are better managed within a battlefield mindset 
than a business context, 2) properly organize the organization’s staff through consistent 
security planning processes, 3) improve overly general technical recommendations that 
create both complexity and unending revision, 4) consider the risk facing the actual 
centers of gravity within an organization, and 5) adapt existing frameworks for crisis 
planning.  This analysis will encompass security-planning methodologies for private-
sector organizations and explore the current Department of Defense process in order to 
determine if the inadequacies of current security models may be improved upon through 
a more detailed application of the Joint Operation Planning Process.  Overarching aspects 
of this investigation will include: identification of existing frameworks; the proper 
classification of security functions; strategic communications to include persuasion 
techniques for subsets of enterprise personnel that resist organizational goals; and 
deliberate crisis planning techniques. 
The difficulty of conveying the nonbusiness nature of enterprise security, while 
aligning security with the business objectives, may lie within the rigid thinking 
surrounding business administration.  Business and technical operations can be base-lined 
against pre-existing metrics such as system availability, units sold, customer satisfaction, 
and more.1 System hardening and the fundamental organization of the business may 
change very little over the course of a few years.  Enterprise security requirements may 
                                                 
1 Kevin Behr, Gene Kim, and George Spafford, The Visible Ops Handbook: Implementing ITIL in 4 
Practical and Auditable Steps, Eugene, Oregon: IT Process Institute, 2007, 4.  
 2 
change by orders of magnitude from one hour to the next.  This can be seen as an 
asymmetric conflict fought on the front lines of the company on a minute-by-minute 
basis.  Although it is true that prevention, detection, and remediation systems far out-
power the scanning “static” generated by immature attacks, it must be understood that 
robotic networks of computers (botnets), massive emailing of computer viruses, new 
phishing attacks, and advanced attack techniques can deliver serious challenges that 
require very technical and specific mitigation tactics. A skilled and creative staff and 
capable equipment are necessities for waging war against the onslaught of attacks that 
confront company assets on a daily basis.2 
B.  THREATS 
Security threats are continually increasing across the globe as firms have entered a 
marketplace without sovereign borders.3  Enterprise security planning frameworks must 
extend beyond the technical business operations of organizations in order to address the 
risks to the core purpose of the firm.  The current trend would indicate a gravitation of 
enterprise security offices to implement more complex management oversight based on 
regulatory and legal compliance initiatives.4  This application of enterprise security 
controls to the sole attention of the legality and viability of business processes as seen 
within a market segment is woefully inadequate to manage the unstructured and 
asymmetric nature of today’s security threats.  It seems that the implementation of 
technical controls versus the institution of proper human involvement has also limited the 
ability for firms to react to crisis as incidents occur due to an over-reliance on consumer-
off-the-shelf solutions.  The increase of out-of-band and unconventional attacks against 
corporate entities will continue as information spillage, denial of service attacks prove to 
be effective means of funding terrorist entities, financial fraud, corporate espionage, and 
                                                 
2 Douglas J. Landoll, The Security Risk Assessment Handbook: A Complete Guide for Performing 
Security Risk Assessments (New York, New York: Auerbach Publications, 2006), 45. 
3 John Rollins, Liana Sun Wyler, and Seth Rosen, “International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: 
Security Threats, U.S. Policy, and Considerations for Congress” (Congressional Research Service Report, 
January 2010), 13. 
4 Andrew Conry-Murray, “PCI And The Circle Of Blame,” Information Week, 23 February 2008, 
http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=206800867 (accessed 3 March 2008). 
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other business impairment.5  An analysis of how to determine the true Center of Gravity 
(COG) within a firm, persuade a population to meet the control objectives of a firm, 
properly define the controls required, and create intelligible plans that achieve the desired 
outcomes while providing for adaptation for disasters or crises is paramount to a firm’s 
ability to adequately manage risk. 
Information Security has become more of a battlefield than a business.  Today’s 
corporations face a multitude of attacks from malicious hackers, criminal organizations, 
terrorist organizations, and corrupt insiders.6  All the while, a firm must be compliant 
with the most current regulatory requirements, moral obligations, and changes within 
society.  The Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) offers some insight on the 
methods by which a firm can become aware of the true threats from malicious hackers 
and regulatory controls, develop a relevant strategy, institute a plan, and become 
responsive within a corporate structure that may be reticent to budget and implement 
enterprise security properly. 
C. ENTERPRISE SECURITY DEFINED 
The purpose of enterprise security is not to eliminate the threat, but implement the 
level of protection required to maintain the preventive, detective, and corrective controls 
to mitigate loss to corporate resources.7  The scope of security is determined by the 
management of confidentiality, integrity, and availability (see Figure 1) of its personnel, 
physical, and information assets.8  This management is in response to threats that present 
the possibility that an entity may cause the assets to be degraded or disrupted in some 
way.  This disruption to business productivity can come about by individual criminal 
acts, criminal organizations, foreign governments, competition, malicious hackers, 
                                                 
5 Nick Bilton, “Hackers Claim to Have PlayStation Users’ Card Data,” New York Times, 28 April 
2011, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/hackers-claim-to-have-playstation-users-card-data/ 
(accessed 22 August 2011). 
6 John Rollins, Liana Sun Wyler, and Seth Rosen, “International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: 
Security Threats, U.S. Policy, and Considerations for Congress” (Congressional Research Service Report, 
January 2010), 13. 
7 Douglas J. Landoll, The Security Risk Assessment Handbook: A Complete Guide for Performing 
Security Risk Assessments (New York, New York: Auerbach Publications, 2006), 160. 
8 Ronald L. Krutz and Russell Dean Vines, The CISSP Prep Guide: Gold Edition (Indianapolis, 
Indiana: Wiley Publishing, 2003), 3. 
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malicious hacker activists (hacktivists), negligent employees, malicious programs, and 
ineffective or inefficient business processes.  Regulatory compliance may also cause a 
loss of business productivity as business processes may need to be altered to fit within the 
new legal frameworks designed to guard against fraudulent, negligent, or illegal supply of 
the firm’s products or services. 
 
Figure 1.   Information Security “CIA” Diagram 
Threats are conducted by threat agents.  These are entities or processes that 
conduct the malicious or generally destructive behavior.  As with the aforementioned 
threats, threat agents may work for regulatory agencies, criminal organizations, or even 
the competition.  The rise in technical speed and proliferation has also increased the 
incident of terrorist funding through the use of hacking techniques.  The prevalence of 
both cyber-based terrorist funding and hacktivism activities from adversarial foreign 
governments underscores the necessity of viewing enterprise security programs as more 
battlefield than business. 
Threats, through their related agents, impact systems through the exploitation of 
vulnerabilities.  A vulnerability is a weakness in a person, system, or process that allows 
 5 
for an adversarial force to disrupt, alter, destroy, or expose confidential information.  The 
most common cause of exploitation of these weaknesses within a firm’s personnel is 
through the use of social engineering or con-artistry.9  In this case, the individual is 
fooled into exposing sensitive or confidential information.  In some cases, physical 
violence or drugs may be used to extract information from the human target.  This is not 
common within the corporate setting, but as terrorist funding and adversarial government 
entities increasingly target critical infrastructures, this may become more commonplace.  
Within a system, vulnerabilities are often encountered though programming flaws or 
weak authentication systems.  These systems are often updated to guard against known 
exploitations on a regular basis; however, the use of poor authentication processes or 
methods can undermine the most secure system.   Business process is often overlooked as 
a point of exploitation by malicious attackers; nevertheless, a business process can be 
manipulated in both legal and illegal contexts to disrupt business productivity. 
Risk management is possibly the most important aspect of enterprise security 
planning.  The probability of an incident through the exploitation of a vulnerability 
should be mitigated to a level that is deemed acceptable by the firm’s senior 
management.  The enterprise security office must understand the purpose of the firm and 
strategically align operations to mitigate, accept, or transfer the risks in a way that is 
financially responsible.  The physical, information, and human assets of the organization, 
should be taken into consideration and assessed appropriately.  This can be done using 
some common social network analysis techniques with impact or importance based on a 
measurement as simple as degrees of centrality (see Figure 2).  In those cases, the degree 
of centrality possessed by a person or system should not be confused with a proper center 
of gravity analysis.  The degree of centrality of the person or system can be used to aide 
the construction of a course of action, but it should not be mistakenly identified as the 
core purpose of the firm.  In some cases, the detailed analysis of the systems themselves 
in relation to the risks facing the relevant vulnerabilities clouds the true intent of risk 
assessment.  Risk is assessed as threats against the firm’s productivity, not as simply the 
threats facing the complex systems therein.  These risks not only fall within those that can 
                                                 
9 Cyrus Peikari and Anton Chuvakin, Security Warrior (Sebatopol, CA: O’Reilly Media Inc., 2004), 
209. 
 6 
directly impact the immediate productivity of the firm, but can be realized through a 
damaged reputation, domestic irresponsibility, moral irresponsibility, or criminal 
negligence.  The way in which a risk is both defined and addressed will be addressed 
within the context of the JOPP’s center of gravity analysis. 
 
Figure 2.   Citrix Interdependency Matrix 
Beyond the identification of threats, exposures, and risk mitigation methodologies 
lies the crisis planning portion of enterprise security operations.  These operations can be 
summarized as those activities dealing with the deterrence, protection, detection, and 
response to administrative, technical, and physical incidents.  To expand on this topic, an 
enterprise security program should not only define the way in which a predictable 
situation is managed and measured, but it should account for situations for which the firm 
was unprepared.  Many incidents can be foreseen as potentially occurring; therefore, at 
the very least, a rudimentary response can be crafted before the incident occurs.  Some 
events are unpredictable and must be addressed as they arise.  In these cases, it is 
important to identify if the anomaly is of malicious intent or random chance.  Often, 
system anomalies are reported as malicious attack when they are actually no more than 
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poor configuration, human error, or an unrelated system error.10  If the incident actually 
is malicious or of a recurrent nature, it should be contained and appropriately addressed.  
The fundamental aspect in dealing with incidents is not catching the culprit or repairing 
the broken information system, but restoring business productivity.  If the business was 
not adversely impacted the incident can be addressed using methods that avoid disrupting 
other business processes or damaging the morale of the staff. 
D.  ENTERPRISE SECURITY FRAMEWORKS 
Currently, many industries depend on frameworks that require years of 
implementation and millions of dollars of human and industrial capital.11  As with any 
well-developed plan, these frameworks offer a number of good ideas for how to manage 
enterprise security.  An enterprise security framework is the method by which the 
security operations are managed within a firm.  These frameworks often contain methods 
for physical, information, and data security operations; however, they will generally 
follow routine business processes to achieve their goals. 
E.  JOINT OPERATION PLANNING PROCESS 
The JOPP provides both a foundational and process-oriented approach to dealing 
with threats.  The foundational aspects deal with strategy and the basics of 
communication.  The JOPP has been used to manage large, complex, missions spanning 
multiple continents, cultures, and languages.  The reduction of a process of such 





                                                 
10Mason Pokladnik, “An Incident Handling Process for Small and Medium Businesses”, SANS 
Institute InfoSec Reading Room, 2007, 
http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/incident/incident-handling-process-small-medium-
businesses_1791. 
11 Charles Robb, “Desperately Seeking Security Frameworks – A Roadmap for State CIOs,” 
NASCIO, March 2009. http://www.nascio.org/publications/documents/NASCIO-SecurityFrameworks.pdf  
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enterprise security officers.  The study and implementation of the concepts contained 
within this process can be of assistance to the effective and efficient management of an 
enterprise security program. 
F.  ENTERPRISE SECURITY PLANNING PROCESS 
The Enterprise Security Planning Process (ESPP) is created within this research 
as a solution that involves both the best aspects of current enterprise security frameworks, 
strategic communications as discussed in the context of information operations, and the 
Joint Operation Planning Process.  The solution is presented as a method by which a firm 
can implement the JOPP to meet their enterprise security program needs.  These 
programs will contain additional details that are not addressed directly within this 
research; nonetheless, effort is made to included appendices to better convey the 
intricacies of the more complex concepts. 
G.  CONCLUSION 
The following chapters will address an understanding of the growing security 
risks facing private organizations, the enterprise security frameworks used in 
corporations today, the Joint Operation Planning Process as currently used by the 
Department of Defense, the incorporation of the Joint Operation Planning Process 
techniques and principles as appropriate for unclassified use in medium to large 
organizations, and the proper establishment of enterprise architectures to meet the 
security threats facing these firms, with special consideration to the ability to properly 
identify the centers of gravity within the organization.  The initial process will involve 
the study and review of information security threats facing critical infrastructures.  A 
proper understanding of existing threats is essential to the analysis or development of a 
security framework.  Successful analysis will be determined by the proper categorization 
of threats facing organizations and the incorporation of appropriate prevention, deterrent, 
and detection mechanisms to mitigate these risks. 
An analysis of the current frameworks in use in corporations across the globe and 
an analysis of the Joint Operation Planning Process will provide for a foundational 
understanding of enterprise security planning.  It is hoped that the analysis of current 
 9 
frameworks for both private sector and Department of Defense entities will elucidate the 
shortcomings and positive attributes of each.  This detailed clarification of the positive 
and negative principles will establish the foundational knowledge from which an analysis 
may be conducted. 
The integration of the established principles will allow for the concise and clear 
construction of a new model developed through this research called the Enterprise 
Security Planning Process (ESPP) that may be instituted for effective enterprise security 
management.  This model will be constructed in hope that it will be applicable in private-
sector entities for the betterment of society through the implementation of business-
driven enterprise security controls in a clear and effective manner with consideration to 
the applicability of the controls for deliberate planning as well as crisis objectives. 
 10 
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II. ENTERPRISE SECURITY PLANNING FRAMEWORKS 
A. MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY 
As stated earlier, there exists a shortcoming in the correlation of incident 
prevention, detection, and response within corporate security operations.12  This failure is 
further exacerbated by the improper focus of the security planning frameworks on which 
proper operations rely.  The seamless integration of true security controls to meet 
business risk requirements is essential to the appropriate protection of firm assets.13  This 
integration requires a strong understanding of the functionality provided by the 
operational units that compose the information security office.  In the absence of this 
understanding, security officers may revert to a business management-oriented approach 
to the design and implementation of security frameworks.  This approach ties much of the 
security program’s success to business and management metrics, that when examined 
more closely, have little to do with the protection of information security assets. 
It is true that the underlying systems must be well planned and implemented 
according to the appropriate business management methodology in use at the 
organization; however, the fundamental management philosophy of the firm should, and 
arguably must, be in place well before any comprehensive organizational structure would 
exist, and especially before a program as mature as a security framework is developed or 
integrated into the firm’s business operations.14  In the case of management philosophy, 
the military’s approach to management standardization saves an enormous degree of 
frustration within a firm regarding what is classified as business appropriate and what 
would be a standing operating procedure.  Even so, there is little evidence that any 
professional organization that would allow the continued employment of senior 
executives, or middle management for that matter, if they did not have a seemingly innate 
                                                 
12 Mark Story, “Sensible Security: Good Information Security is About Risk Awareness as Well as 
Sensible Investment in Automated Controls,” Management Today (Sydney: Australia Institute of 
Management, 2008). 
13 Ibid. 
14 Chet Jernigan, “County and Municipal Government in North Carolina,” The University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2007. 
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understanding of proper business management.  The reality is that a management 
philosophy is established well before the more mature organizational programs are 
instituted.  In this vein, the problematic nature of management-centric security 
frameworks becomes increasingly evident. 
In the words of an author regarding his book written to help managers interpret a 
single security framework for business use, he commented that his book “will save you 
months of work.”15  His book describes how to manage security governance for an 
organization, not the actual security of the organization.  This underscores the lack of 
awareness surrounding the threats facing organizations from the core industries that 
manage the nation’s critical infrastructure to the smaller businesses that may operate a 
hometown tax practice.  Much of the time planning security operations within a firm is 
spent designing the management aspects of the underlying security organization, which 
should already be in place.  Additional inspection into the International Information 
Systems Security Certification Consortium Inc. (ISC)2’s “10 Security Domains,” 
ISACA’s “5 CISM Practice Areas,” British Standards Institution’s (BSI) Industry 
Standards Organization’s (ISO) ISO 27001 (ISO 27002 defines the controls), and the IT 
Service Management Forum’s Information Technology Infrastructure Library’s (ITIL) 
guidance for integrating Information Technology (IT) services within a business spend a 
majority of their time discussing the bureaucratic structure required to manage the 
security infrastructure.  For too long, the focus of security operations has been upon the 
proper institution of bureaucratic managerial systems to the detriment of the actual 
protection mechanisms that would provide meaningful security to an organization.   
In some cases, the intractability of the senior management may be the most 
daunting obstacle working against the implementation of satisfactory security controls.16  
In this case, the onus is upon the information security officer’s shoulders to properly 
convey the threats facing the firm and the methods by which these threats may be 
overcome.  The overzealous nature of some security officers has led to a reticence among 
                                                 
15 “IT Governance’s Complete ISO27001/ISO27002 Documentation Toolkit,” IT Governance, 2005-
2008 v7, www.itgovernance.co.uk. 
16 NIST Special Publication 800-39, Managing Information Security Risk Organization, Mission, and 
Information System View: Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative Information Security (Gaithersburg, 
MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology, March 2011). 
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the executive staff to accept proposals relevant to firm security operations.17  This 
hesitance to accept the program proposals is often due to a disconnection between the 
concepts of what is actually required versus the security proposal that has been submitted. 
Executives in control of an organization’s security may fall into three categories.  
The belief that all individuals in this role can be segregated into three roles is an over 
simplification, but it will serve to illustrate the problems currently facing the firms that 
manage the critical infrastructures of the United States.  It is true that security and 
convenience do not go hand-in-hand, but there is an adequate middle-ground that can be 
achieved through a proper understanding of the threats, controls, and short-comings of 
security frameworks facing firms today.  In the next few paragraphs the three categories 
will be discussed in more detail, with a final statement regarding the improper categorical 
allocation of time and resources within the most prevalent security frameworks. 
1.  Management-Oriented Security Professional 
The first category of this discussion involves a management-oriented security 
professional that is overly interested in matching security controls to business processes.  
At the onset, this concept seems that it would be the most logical approach to the 
appropriate integration of security operations with business requirements; however, this 
is not the goal of this particular category of individual.  The business-oriented 
professional is more keen on the proper interpretation of business outcomes than on the 
threats facing the firm’s assets.  This individual understands business processes, sales, 
revenue, risk mitigation, regulation, and the firm’s varied practice areas.  The 
management of vendors, contractors, and personnel are key for this individual, with 
negotiations and business contracts following at a close second place.  The unpredictable 
disruption of business processes by malicious criminal organizations, adversarial 
governments, terrorist organizations, individual hackers, or loosely knit hacking activists 
(hacktivists) is unavoidable, and unfortunately, unexpected by this type of individual.  
This category has taken the time to plan for business-oriented approaches to known 
threats, with a disregard for the erratic nature of information security.  The bottom line 
                                                 
17 Laurie Kelly and John McCumber, Assessing and Managing Security Risk in IT Systems: A 
Structured Methodology (New York, New York: Auerbach Publications, 2005). 
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for this category of security professional is the proper documentation of security controls 
and the proper development of a formal business plan to address these controls.  In 
reality, this individual’s behavior is analogous to someone buying insurance for their 
home and locking the doors and windows when they are away.  They fail to consider the 
possibility that a malevolent hacker may break the windows or destroy the foundation of 
the house to ruin or remove the contents.  The firm’s reputation would be tarnished to a 
point of total loss, but the paperwork would be sufficient for almost any regulatory 
requirement. 
2.  Security-Centric Professional 
The next category of security professional in this discussion will be called the 
security-centric professional.  This individual is overly concerned with mitigating the 
risks facing the organization.  This category involves a team whose sole purpose is to 
identify and remove every potential threat from an organization.  The policies that are 
common within this category involves everything from the requirement of the company 
to monitor an employee’s personal use of the Internet within their own home, the scrutiny 
of meaning behind employee blog comments, personal statements, and family members, 
to the complete annexation of company-owned equipment for approved business 
purposes only.  There are companies that would not allow the use of any application, 
including word processors, without the explicit approval of the firm’s finance office with 
the appropriate allocation of budget codes.  This can cascade into the types of cell 
phones, computers, cameras, copiers, and fax machines that employees are allowed to use 
at their private homes.  This individual is not concerned with accomplishing the 
organization’s mission, but only with the most secure method by which these systems 
may be utilized within the firm.  Usability is lost to security.  This individual’s program 
could be analogous to the house that is encased in lead, then concrete, and then 
thoroughly setup with proximity alarms at the only entrance.  The difficulty of 
maintaining security thwarts business productivity.  This office believes that every aspect 
of the business should be mathematically definable and planned accordingly.  As absurd 
as it sounds, the prevalence of this type of thinking is becoming more commonplace in 
management and engineering professions.  The idea that all variables already exist and 
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can actually be counted, ascribed to a meaning, and correlated to a business or security 
purpose is flawed.  Whether this concept comes from the educational system regarding 
evolutionary concepts that cannot be questioned or scientific principles that are beyond 
reproach, it is not clear.  What is clear, is that this concept damages the bottom line of an 
organization by preventing or limiting useful output. 
3.  Joint Operations Security Professional 
The final category in this illustration is the joint operations security professional 
that uses the proper combination of the multiple facets contain within the information 
security domains and practice areas.  This understanding allows for the effective 
coordination of distinct administrative, technical, and physical resources and capabilities 
to develop a proper system capable of defining the security operations of the firm.  This 
posture is determined through a skilled examination of the threats facing the firm’s assets, 
the vulnerabilities inherent to, or injected into, these assets, and the protection 
mechanisms that are appropriate to meet the firm’s tolerance for the risk associated to 
these assets.  To understand this relationship, a joint operations approach not only takes 
into account the management of the system, but allows for the response to unexpected 
input.  As will be discussed in later chapters, this will involve the incorporation of critical 
information requirements regarding the firm’s goals, an analysis of the impact resulting 
from the exploitation of existing or created vulnerabilities in firm assets, and proper 
measures of performance and effectiveness in regard to the mission at hand.  This 
professional’s philosophy can be best likened to the concept, “Don’t sweat the small 
stuff.”18  This individual takes the time to understand the most important operations and 
systems within the firm.  This virtual inventory is thoroughly examined for 
vulnerabilities.  This knowledge is combined with an expert awareness of the threats that 
exist and how they would exploit vulnerabilities in the firm’s systems.  These metrics are 
then used to develop or acquire the appropriate protection mechanisms that provide the 
most effective means of reducing the impact of malicious, disastrous, errant, or negligent 
activity to meet the firm’s risk tolerance.  A solid understanding of the industry’s most 
                                                 
18 Richard Carlson, Don’t Sweat the Small Stuff and It’s All Small Stuff: Simple Ways to Keep the 
Little Things from Taking Over Your Life (New York, New York: Hyperion Books, 1997), 89. 
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prevalent approaches to information security, the threats facing organizations today, and 
the joint operation planning process provides this professional with a solid foundation to 
secure an organizations personnel, facilities, and information. 
B.  OPERATIONAL SECURITY FRAMEWORKS 
Currently, many industries depend on one of the many prevalent operational 
security frameworks to manage their information security activities.19  There are several 
additional frameworks that are worthy of comparison and discussion, but predominately, 
the Industry Standards Organization (ISO), Payment Card Industry (PCI), the Information 
Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA), and the Information Technology 
Service Management Forum (itSMF) are the organizations leading framework 
development around the globe.  Deficiencies in the frameworks developed by these 
organizations will be discussed throughout each section; however, the primary goal of 
this section is not to merely define the problems within the program, but to also convey 
the primary organizational objective promoted by each framework.  As with any well-
developed organizational plan, there is a great deal to learn from studying these 
frameworks and their associated ideological exhortations.  Much of the information 
contained within each framework is very relevant to the enterprise security needs of firms 
across the globe.  Having implemented any of these frameworks, a firm could expect to 
achieve a more capable posture in protecting their assets.  
An enterprise security framework could be defined as being a combination of 
methodology and procedure for governing the enterprise security operations of a firm or 
organization.20  This would include the overarching concepts surrounding the risks facing 
administrative, technical, and physical assets within the firm, as well as a solution geared 
to address each area.  As the capabilities and features offered by industry increase and 
become more complex, so must the security program evolve.  The security landscape has 
                                                 
19 Charles Robb, “Desperately Seeking Security Frameworks – A Roadmap for State CIOs,” 




changed in the last decade, allowing exploits to be introduced at incredible speeds.21  
This puts pressure on the security function of a firm to become increasingly agile and 
adaptable to the ever-changing topography.  Enterprise security frameworks must rely on 
concepts more appropriate for a battlefield scenario than that of a business.  Corporations 
face a multitude of threats from malicious hackers, criminal organizations, terrorist 
organizations, and corrupt insiders.  All the while, a firm must be compliant with the 
most current regulatory requirements.  Enterprise security frameworks should enable the 
balance between business process and security capability, while maintaining extreme 
agility.  In most cases, regulation trumps reality. 
As evidenced by current events in the media and within the information security 
community, the most prevalent security frameworks lack the core identification of what 
is truly important to a corporation’s security.22  This is exacerbated by a lack of 
examination of the techniques required for organizing differing departments to produce a 
successful security operation.  It would appear that more often than not, the introduction 
of a security framework provides a regulatory barrier to divert blame or simply inflate 
capabilities to appease client concerns.  It is repeatedly reported that the overwhelming 
detail required to implement many frameworks will take a well-organized firm years of 
concerted effort to merely establish the program and many more to build a monitoring 
and reporting system to take advantage of it.23  Over the next few sections, four 
prominent security frameworks will be discussed, with special attention paid to the 
primary focus of each framework, its use in an enterprise, noteworthy deficiencies.  In the 
future chapters, a more direct review of when and where the Joint Operation Planning 
Process could be introduced to alleviate many of these shortfalls will be discussed. 
                                                 
21 “Lumension Scan,” April 2009, http://www.lumension.com/vulnerability-
management/vulnerability-assessment-software.aspx (accessed July 2011). 
22 Steve Ragan, “Does the Heartland Breach Prove PCI Useless?,” 26 January 2009, 
http://www.thetechherald.com/article.php/200905/2849/Does-the-Heartland-breach-prove-PCI-useless 
(accessed 18 August 2011). 
23 Charles Robb, “Desperately Seeking Security Frameworks – A Roadmap for State CIOs,” 
NASCIO, March 2009, 3. 
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1.  British Standards Institution (BSI) International Organization for 
Standardization’s 27001 Framework (ISO/IEC 27001:2005)24 
As the most comprehensive and mature framework used in the private sector, the 
ISO 27001 framework is considered a daunting, overly bureaucratic standard whose 
comprehensive implementation would bring any firm’s security operations to a crawl.25  
It was developed by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) in October 2005 as a replacement for 
the British Standards Institution’s BS7799, developed in 1995.  Implementation of the 
ISO 27001 framework allows an enterprise to receive ISO 27001 Certification, which, in 
turn, allows for audits and formal compliance certificates.  The goal of the program is to 
establish a cohesive and integrated approach to managing information security 
requirements.  The program is comprised of approximately 13 primary security 
management categories with over 200 subcategories (Table 1).  Throughout the entirety 
of the published framework, there is no reference to what would be considered an actual 
security control mechanism.  There is no mention of how, when, where, or why to 
implement firewalls, identity management systems, door locks, or even security 
awareness programs.  There are three sections that refer to the proper use of passwords 
and another section discussing the importance of clock synchronization.  The framework 
also provides for three levels of auditing by means of the formal certification standard.  
The stages are designed to audit the firm’s compliance with the framework at 
increasingly demanding levels of difficulty.  This is a profitable option for firms offering 
auditing services for the ISO 27001 certification. 
                                                 
24 Alberto Bastos and Rosangela Caubit, ISO 27001 and 27002: Information Security Management 
(Atlanta, GA: Módulo Security Solutions, 2010). 




Primary Security Management Categories 
Structure 
Risk Assessment and Treatment 
Security Policy 
Organization of Information Security 
Asset Management 
Human Resources Security 
Physical Security 
Communications and Ops Management 
Access Control 
Information Systems Acquisition, Development, Maintenance 
Information Security Incident management 
Business Continuity 
Compliance 
Table 1.   Primary Security Management Categories26 
The primary deficiency perceived within this framework is its indomitable size 
and complexity.  In a publication written in 2009, Charles Robb reported that the program 
took most businesses over a year to implement, requiring numerous additional years to 
develop for management and monitoring systems that were capable of auditing the 
project.27  Due to the vague nature of much of the framework, endless checklists could be 
developed to provide assistance with its continued management.  Perhaps the most 
intriguing aspect is the amount of data that the certified firms are losing.  Many of the 
recipients of the ISO 27000 series certification were at the top of the list of companies 
that have experienced the most devastating security breaches in the history of the 





                                                 
26 ISO/IEC 27002, 19 December 2010, http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=403171569 
(accessed 16 January 2011). 
27 Charles Robb, “Desperately Seeking Security Frameworks – A Roadmap for State CIOs,” 
NASCIO, March 2009, 3. 
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records lost from TRW; 90,000,000 records lost from Sears Roebuck; 77,000,000 records 
lost from Sony Corporation; and 25,000,000 records lost from HM Revenue and 
Customs.28, 29 
Overall, this program attempts to continuously grow a program centered in 
bureaucratic management of information systems and corporate process.  The 
increasingly long duration required to implement this framework, coupled with the 
diminishing amount of time in which new security exploits are uncovered and introduced 
into the wild, makes for a complicated proposal regarding the viability of such an 
investment.  This daunting framework also leaves the identification, selection, and 
methods for the proper implementation of most technical controls up to the enterprise 
itself.  This is certainly not to say that an enterprise security framework should provide a 
technical procedure manual for vendor-specific security appliances and software, but it 
should certainly provide for the base capabilities.  After years of considering the options 
regarding various security frameworks available to private industry, firms believe that a 
solution should be available that both provides for a straightforward method for 
integration into the existing management operations and culture, and improves the 
enterprise security infrastructure for which it was acquired. 
2.  Payment Card Industry – Data Security Standards (PCI-DSS)30 31 
Possibly the most comprehensible framework is the PCI-DSS, which, in reality, is 
not a formal framework at all, but a cohesive set of security standards designed to aid 
merchants who accept credit cards properly manage their security operations.  Created in 
December 2004, this framework was developed through a joint venture between a few 
large credit card processors, American Express, Discover Financial Services, JCB, 
MasterCard Worldwide, and Visa International.32  As of version 2.0, the PCI-DSS 
                                                 
28 Dataloss Database, Open Security Foundation, 2011, http://datalossdb.org/index/latest.  
29 ISO Certification List, British Standards Institution, http://www.bsigroup.com/en/Assessment-and-
certification-services/Client-directory/CertificateClient-Directory-
Search/Post.aspx?id=88254&epslanguage=EN (accessed 1 July 2011). 
30 PCI-DSS., http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Payment_Card_Industry_Data_Security_Standard. 
31 PCI DSS Requirements and Security Assessment Procedures, Version 2.0 (October 2010). 
32 PCI-DSS FAQs, GFI Software, http://www.gfi.com/security/pcifaqs.htm.  
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framework provides for twelve primary requirements ranging from firewall configuration 
to policy development (Table 2).  These requirements are further developed through the 
incorporation of approximately 426 defining aspects that further aid the merchant in 
compliance with the primary goals.  The local banks, which operate merchant accounts, 
process the credit card transactions for the credit card processor.  This security standard 
provides a, mostly, straightforward method to manage their security operations. 
 
PCI-DSS Framework 
Requirement 1: Install and maintain a firewall configuration to protect cardholder data 
Requirement 2: Do not use vendor-supplied defaults for system passwords and other 
security parameters 
Requirement 3: Protect stored cardholder data 
Requirement 4: Encrypt transmission of cardholder data across open, public networks 
Requirement 5: Use and regularly update anti-virus software or programs 
Requirement 6: Develop and maintain secure systems and applications 
Requirement 7: Restrict access to cardholder data by business need to know 
Requirement 8: Assign a unique ID to each person with computer access 
Requirement 9: Restrict physical access to cardholder data 
Requirement 10: Track and monitor all access to network resources and cardholder data 
Requirement 11: Regularly test security systems and processes. 
Requirement 12: Maintain a policy that addresses information security for all personnel. 
Table 2.   PCI-DSS Framework33 
As with any private sector program developed by the banking industry, there are 
some interesting caveats regarding the true intentions of the program.  It has been said 
that the PCI-DSS requirement is actually so strict as to be unachievable, allowing for 
what has been touted as “The PCI-DSS Blame Game” causing all monetary damages to 
be deflected back to the local merchant.34  Any failure to meet all of the requirements 
presented in the PCI-DSS standard allows for the credit card processor to divert monetary 
damages back to the credit card merchant account, who originally processed the request.  
The breach implications are teamed with additional benefits and fines.  PCI-DSS also 
provides justification to move a merchant account up or down a credit processing scale.  
                                                 
33 PCI DSS Requirements and Security Assessment Procedures, Version 2.0 (October 2010), 3. 
34 Andrew Conry-Murray, “PCI And The Circle Of Blame,” Information Week, 23 February 2008, 
http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=206800867 (accessed 3 March 2008). 
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At the top-end of the scale, the merchant is said to be in full compliance with PCI-DSS; 
therefore, the merchant would receive the benefit of lower transaction fees and reduced 
monthly recurring fees.  At the bottom-end of the scale, the merchant would be required 
to pay a premium to provide credit card processing to their clients and would be forced to 
pay additional monthly recurring fees.  This not only affects the per transaction and 
recurring fees associated with providing credit card processing services, but it provides 
for the credit card processor a method by which to associate the legal and financial 
implications of a breach to the local merchant account.  This is an improvement for the 
credit card processor, as for many years fraudulent charges were a liability to the main 
processor and not the local merchant account.  This now allows the large credit card 
processing entities to avoid losses from credit card fraud or system exploitation. 
Primarily, the focus on legal and financial repudiation, the increasingly specific 
requirements, and the failure to address departmental interoperability issues surrounding 
organizational security operations plagues this framework.  The requirements range from 
the type and length of a password to the duration that a system may operate without a 
patch.  In many cases these requirements are moot or unnecessarily restrictive.  Many of 
the requirements would be analogous to requiring a 300 meter water resistance 
certification for global positioning satellite hardware; however, failure to meet the 
requirements, even the useless ones, may result in otherwise unpreventable fraudulent 
actions being legally attributable to the local merchant account.  This focus on the legal 
versus the necessary may be evidenced in the data loss statistics, which report that the 
security standards used in creating the PCI-DSS framework did not prevent CardSystems, 
Visa, MasterCard, and American Express from losing 40,000,000 records in 2005.35,36 
This, coupled with the stringent, yet sometimes useless technical requirements, makes for 
various interpretations of the real purpose behind the PCI-DSS.  Moving beyond the legal 
and financial penalties, the lack of joint departmental support within the program can 
result in process duplication or inattention.  Whereas the duplication of effort may only 
create inefficiencies and personnel conflicts, the nonexecution of security controls may 
                                                 
35 Andrew Conry-Murray, “PCI And The Circle Of Blame,” Information Week, 23 February 2008, 
http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=206800867 (accessed 3 March 2008). 
36 Dataloss Database, Open Security Foundation, 2011. http://datalossdb.org/index/latest (accessed 
July 2011). 
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result in unauthorized disclosure, alteration, or unavailability of organizational assets.  
These failures could result in irreparable harm to the company.  Additional attention may 
be brought to what the PCI-DSS calls, “Compensating Controls.”  These are exceptions 
to the programs requirements that are officially allowed by the auditor or card processor.  
These controls allow for businesses to fall short in some areas and still receive a stamp of 
approval for business practices. 
3.  Information Technology Service Management Forum’s (itSMF) 
Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL)37 
The final two frameworks in this discussion move further from enterprise security 
planning and operations into the realm of general information technology governance.  
They are included in the enterprise security analysis, as they are commonly used to both 
manage enterprise technology and enterprise security.  In this case, the former application 
is properly applied, whereas the latter is somewhat inadequate to meet the needs of 
today’s security landscape.  The first of these two frameworks is ITIL.  ITIL was 
originally designed by the British Central Computer and Telecommunications Agency to 
provide a system by which organizations could create cohesive information technology 
management operations to provide for customer service.  Originally, in the mid-1990s, 
ITIL was composed of thirty volumes.  The massive information overhead associated 
with beginning an ITIL-based process led the newly established Office of Government 
Commerce to reduce the publication to eight logical volumes.  The volumes define four 
phases for IT service management under which there are approximately forty auxiliary 
objectives (Table 3). 
 
ITIL Phases 
Phase One: “Stabilize The Patient” And “Modify First Response” 
Phase Two: “Catch & Release” And “Find Fragile Artifacts” Projects 
Phase Three: Create A Repeatable Build Library  
Phase Four: Continual Improvement 
Table 3.    ITIL Phases38  
                                                 
37 Kevin Behr, Gene Kim, and George Spafford, The Visible Ops Handbook: Implementing ITIL in 4 
Practical and Auditable Steps (Eugene, Oregon: IT Process Institute, 2007), 25-64. 
38 Ibid. 
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The primary goal of ITIL is to provide a service-centric model for corporations 
and government entities to provide business services of the best quality and appropriate 
quantity.  Many organizations that subscribe to the ITIL methodology for IT management 
have also attempted to apply this framework to their security programs.  Unfortunately, 
the ITIL framework is poorly designed for this purpose, and may event cause rifts within 
the information technology division itself.39  The fundamental problem with enforcing 
ITIL within an enterprise security infrastructure is the misallocation of resources and 
inappropriate benchmarking.  The metrics used to measure the effectiveness within the 
ITIL framework surround capacity management, service continuity, customer response 
ratings, configuration management, and freezing operations until proper management is 
implemented.  These are very positive goals for any information technology department, 
but information security requires both agility and highly skilled personnel.  Thorough 
documentation of business processes will never be an acceptable alternative to having 
individuals who can make decisions and think through complex situations. 
The primary shortcomings in using ITIL as a framework for enterprise security 
operations are that it lacks virtually every security control and process known and that it 
creates a bureaucratic system that limits individual responsibility.40  ITIL establishes 
control review boards for most projects and configuration modifications.  No one person 
is permitted complete control over any system.41  Whereas Two-Person Integrity (TPI) is 
a necessary solution when considering the employment of a nuclear weapon, it is poorly 
suited for the daily operations of an enterprise security division.  It could be argued that it 
is a bad solution for the management of information technology departments, as well.  
Security operations can require a level of agility that is impossible to achieve when a 
operational review board is required for each decision.  This framework is best suited for 
individuals who do not have access to the underlying technical architecture of the 
enterprise or its security infrastructure.  The engineers and architects that design and 
                                                 
39 John Wallhoff. ITIL Security Management Presentation, May 2005, 
http://www.scillani.se/assets/pdf/Scillani%20Presentation%20ITIL%20Security%20Managment.pdf 
(accessed 1 July 2011). 
40 Ibid. 
41 Kevin Behr, Gene Kim, and George Spafford, The Visible Ops Handbook: Implementing ITIL in 4 
Practical and Auditable Steps (Eugene, Oregon: IT Process Institute, 2007), 25–64. 
 25 
manage these should be held responsible for their actions because they probably already 
possess a level of maturity that comes with the experience required to reach a high level 
of responsibility.  The detective controls indicated in this framework underscore the 
difficulty adhering to the program.  This can be exemplified in one corporate example 
where the increased complexity caused by implementing the ITIL framework did untold 
damage to the corporation’s bottom line.  A manager rolled-out the ITIL change 
management process by using the recommend change control review board.  This is a 
group of individuals that must read and approve all changes submitted by the technical 
staff.  The review board may possess less knowledge concerning the impact of the change 
than the technician submitting the request.  The corporation found that the inefficiency 
created by the program was so great that the information technology staff was required to 
circumvent the framework to maintain fundamental corporate operations.  The 
management staff did not interpret the circumvention as a necessity to keep the business 
operational, but enforced the zero-tolerance policy in respect to using the change control 
review board that had been established.  There was no data available to document what 
occurred after the zero-tolerance policy regarding the change control review board was 
enforced, but it would be conceivable that the firm ceased to exist. 
4.  Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) Control 
Objectives for Information and Related Technology (CobiT)42 
CobiT will be the final framework used to illustrate the need for a new 
methodology of managing enterprise security.  CobiT is, once again, not specifically 
designed with enterprise security infrastructures in mind; nonetheless, many firms are 
using it as the primary source for enterprise security planning around the world.  Much of 
the misapplication of the previous mentioned frameworks can be traced back to an 
unsatisfactory understanding of the difference between the battlefield of enterprise 
security operations as compared to standard information technology operations. 
CobiT was designed by what is now ISACA in 1994 to establish a cohesive 
means by which the technical operations of a corporation could be governed.  The 
predominant focus regards the proper understanding of business needs, as fulfilled by 
                                                 
42 CobiT 4.1 (Rolling Meadows, IL: IT Governance Institute, 2007). 
 26 
technical solutions in the most efficient way possible.  It is comprised of four primary 
categories over thirty-four (Table 4) defined processes that are rated using the Software 
Engineering Institute’s (SEI’s) Capability Maturity Model (CMM).  Even though the 
CobiT framework is highly complex and comprehensive, it still calls on the following 
standards for additional content: 
• ITIL for service delivery 
• CMM for solution delivery 
• ISO 17799 for information security 
• PMBOK or PRINCE2 for project management. 
Even though ISACA admitted that CobiT is not adequate for enterprise security 
governance, this does not seem to affect the decision of corporations to continue to 
implement security systems by way of CobiT.  Risk is the primary concern for corporate 
security, and risk has traditionally been managed using business process against definable 
variables.  Mitigating risk has been a calculated business program, not the rugged battle 
plan proposed in this research.  There is always a risk associated with bringing a new 
product to market.  The community may also reject changes in color, flavor, or function 
of existing products. Predictions made regarding the Stock Market or other financial 
obligations can sometimes be mitigated by a single department or contract.  The CobiT 
framework is more of a system management philosophy or foundational instructional 
guide.  It certainly should not be considered a solution for the joint incorporation of 




4 Primary Categories: 
Plan and Organize 
Acquire and Implement 
Deliver and Support 
Monitor and Evaluate 
 
Plan and Organize: 
PO1 Define a strategic IT plan. 
PO2 Define the information architecture. 
PO3 Determine technological direction. 
PO4 Define the IT processes, organization 
and relationships. 
PO5 Manage the IT investment. 
PO6 Communicate management aims and 
direction. 
PO7 Manage IT human resources. 
PO8 Manage quality. 
PO9 Assess and manage IT risks. 
PO10 Manage projects. 
 
Acquire and Implement: 
AI1 Identify automated solutions. 
AI2 Acquire and maintain application 
software. 
AI3 Acquire and maintain technology 
infrastructure. 
AI4 Enable operation and use. 
AI5 Procure IT resources. 
AI6 Manage changes. 




Deliver and Support: 
DS1 Define and manage service levels. 
DS2 Manage third-party services. 
DS3 Manage performance and capacity. 
DS4 Ensure continuous service. 
DS5 Ensure systems security. 
DS6 Identify and allocate costs. 
DS7 Educate and train users. 
DS8 Manage service desk and incidents. 
DS9 Manage the configuration. 
DS10 Manage problems. 
DS11 Manage data. 
DS12 Manage the physical environment. 
DS13 Manage operations. 
 
 
Monitor and Evaluate: 
ME1 Monitor and evaluate IT performance. 
ME2 Monitor and evaluate internal control. 
ME3 Ensure compliance with external 
requirements. 




Level 0: Non-existent 
Level 1: Initial/ad hoc 
Level 2: Repeatable but Intuitive 
Level 3: Defined Process 
Level 4: Managed and Measurable 
Level 5: Optimized 
Table 4.   CobiT Framework43 
                                                 
43 COBIT 4.1 (Rolling Meadows, IL: IT Governance Institute, 2007), 26. 
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The National Institute of Science and Technology Risk Management Framework 
(NIST RMF) deserves some mention as it is composed of over 1,323 pages of resources 
that can be used to develop an information security framework.44  The NIST 
methodologies started as a program to aid the health care industry with the Health 
Insurance Portability and Protection Act (HIPPA).  Regardless of the initial purpose, the 
methodologies are useful across any industry desiring to augment their understanding of 
security controls and methodologies.  A NIST RMF implementation methodology is now 
under development; however, the use of the RMF as an industry standard framework has 
not taken hold.  Even so, the individual NIST Special Publications (SP) that compose the 
RMF are widely used in the development of alternative frameworks across multiple 
disciplines.  The reservation regarding NIST RMF implementation as the guiding 
framework may be related to the tens of thousands of pages of policies, standards, 
guidelines, and procedures that NIST has produced over the years.  In this case, it is not 
the failure to provide an adequate information repository for its advocates, but an 
overload of information.  It is clear that the methodologies and principles developed and 
endorsed by NIST will continue to be a driving force in the advancement of 
understanding information security; nonetheless, the concerted implementation of the 
comprehensive NIST RMF may still remain a noble academic exercise for the 
foreseeable future. 
C.  SECURITY FRAMEWORK SOLUTION 
The four frameworks mentioned above are the predominate forces in corporate 
America.  These are the standards and frameworks that Chief Information Officers 
(CIOs) and, sadly, Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs) see as comprehensive 
solutions for enterprise security governance.  More often than not, these frameworks may 
further complicate an already complicated situation, concealing the program deficiencies 
through excessive reporting and bureaucratic overhead.  This problem is further 
augmented by the detailed complexity in the reporting systems themselves.  A 
                                                 
44 NIST RMF Documents: FIPS-PUB-199-final.pdf, FIPS-PUB-200-final-march.pdf, Risk-
Management-Framework-2009.pdf, SP800-18-rev1-final, SP800-30, SP800-37-rev1-final, SP800-39-final, 
SP800-53A-rev1-final, SP800-53, SP800-59, SP800-60_Vol1-Rev1, SP800-60_Vol2-Rev1 (2011). 
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department could spend a month of concerted effort to produce a weekly report.  The 
weekly report that is produced is not only almost a month behind schedule, but it really 
does not reflect reality in the first place.  A common sense methodology that incorporates 
the joint requirements and capabilities of the business’s various units is needed to combat 
this aggravating dilemma.  A solution that takes into consideration the requirements, 
functionality, and interoperability to produce a verifiable course of action that maintains 
the agility required to combat intermittent and unexpected threats is a necessity. 
It has been said that employees are the biggest threat to a firm’s security.45  If this 
is the case, then move the firm’s confidential records to the sidewalk, away from the 
employees, and monitor the firm’s progress from there; nonetheless, if the executive 
management is leaning on the already mentioned frameworks to provide a solution for 
enterprise security governance, than it might just be true. 
                                                 
45 Eric Cole and Sandra Ring, Insider Threat: Protecting the Enterprise from Sabotage, Spying, and 
Theft (Waltham, Massachusetts: Syngress, 2006), 8. 
 30 




III.  THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING PROCESS AND 
INFORMATION OPERATIONS FOR CORPORATIONS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Many of the failures associated with enterprise security planning frameworks and 
operations may revolve around the interpretation of enterprise security activities into 
business management concepts.  The conceptual risk framework designed for overt and 
legitimate business transactions often does not meet the criteria for circumstances that 
arise as the result of illegal actions.  Beyond risk management, failures are associated 
with the unification of effort, the clear delineation of objectives, the proper allocation of 
resources to tasks, and appropriate communications among teams. 
Within enterprise security, there are three key concepts that represent areas with 
the highest probability of failure: 1) Understanding, 2) Planning, and 3) Communication.  
Core capabilities must be centered within these key areas to produce a viable enterprise 
security plan.46  A failure within any of these key areas will result in the inability for an 
organization to maintain adequate levels of security.  In such cases, corporations must 
abandon risk mitigation and accept the higher cost of risk transfer to insurance options to 
meet the basic requirements for regulatory compliance and the impending litigation that 
will occur due to the lack of reasonable procedures.  Primarily, this chapter will 
investigate the Joint Operation Planning Process as it is involved within Information 
Operations to create a planning and communications process that is capable of meeting 
the requirements for a successful enterprise security program. 
In many instances, corporations lack the requisite skills needed to ascertain 
whether a security professional is capable to meet the requirements of the job.  As a 
result, corporations have regressed to standard business management concepts 
surrounding common regulatory definitions of risk management and organizational 
                                                 
46 “Poor Understanding Of Information Security Risk At Many Firms, Survey Finds,” April 2011, 
http://www.infosecurity-us.com/view/17368/poor-understanding-of-information-security-risk-at-many-
firms-survey-finds/ (accessed 1 August 2011). 
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liability.  Corporations will commonly attempt to convey their needs in general terms 
such as confidentiality, integrity, availability, the reduction of vulnerabilities, and 
compliance.  In such cases, a reliance on certifications and academic credentials will 
assist in the process, but even these aspects will require an interviewer that possess the 
skill to determine if an individual has an actual understanding of the concept described in 
the job description.  In these cases, employment outsourcing firms may provide 
organizations with the tools needed for the proper acquisition of talent. 
Beyond the foundational knowledge required to lead information security 
operations, the ability to conduct proper planning within an organization to implement 
security controls to meet organizational mission objectives is critical.  To better 
understand the relationship that will be drawn between the previous chapter and this 
chapter, Information Operations components and the Joint Operation Planning Process 
will be summarized.  The summaries will attempt to provide an overview of the 
military’s current conceptual framework, while drawing from some private industry 
concepts of similar activities. 
B.  THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING PROCESS 
War plans cover every aspect of a war, and weave them all into a single 
operation that must have a single, ultimate objective in which all particular 
aims are reconciled. No one starts a war or rather, no one ought to do so 
without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war 
and how he intends to conduct it.47 
The Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) provides a straightforward process 
for the development of effective mission orders.  National operations are complex, joint 
operations conducted through and within foreign territories, and in conjunction with 
allied or friendly foreign nationals achieve levels of daunting complexity.  The JOPP 
takes a portion of a complex process and reduces it to the most critical components 
necessary to meet the mission objectives at hand.  From initiation to final plan 
                                                 
47 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (London, England: Penguin Group, 1982. First published 1832 by 
Vom Kriege), chapter 2.  
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development, the commander exercises strategic control and communication, while 
entrusting subordinate and cooperative commands with their mission objectives.  The 
process, as defined below, does require several fundamental concepts to be understood 
and acted upon by the initiating command throughout the operations.  The reduced 
complexity of this process still exceeds the requirements of an enterprise security 
framework instituted within a large corporation.  Due to the dynamic environment in 
which military operations are conducted, it is necessary that some concepts contained 
within the JOPP are excluded to better lay a foundation for the creation of a private-
sector enterprise security framework and planning process. 
A mission of any complexity cannot be completed without the vision and strategic 
direction of the commander.  The commander must have a solid understanding of the task 
to be accomplished and must clearly convey this message to the forces involved.  This 
communication should be orchestrated in such a way as to both reinforce the purpose of 
the mission, and garner widespread support.  To gain support the message should be 
crafted in clear terms and through subtle persuasion.  The vision should be communicated 
in a way that conveys the message with utmost accuracy and does not generate excessive 
damage to morale.  Having established the strategic direction, established the proper 
staffing and command relationship channels, and having created a system by which the 
commander can conduct strategic communications throughout the entire mission, the 
process may begin. 
At the beginning of the process, there must be a subset of capabilities 
communicated to the forces involved.  The strategy and concept of battle will set the 
stage from which the command will begin the planning process.  An overall view of this 
procedure brings the strategic guidance and mission concept to the creation of a plan.  
Within the planning process, refinement, adaptations, and the decision to abort or to 
proceed with the mission are conducted.48 
 
 
                                                 
48 Joint Operation Planning: Joint Publication 5-0. (26 December 2006), III-5. 
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 1. Strategic Guidance. 
 2. Concept Development. 
 3. Plan Development. 
 4. Plan Assessment (Refine, Adapt, Terminate, Execute). 
In order to pick concepts that best suit the case analysis relating to enterprise 
security, portions of the JOPP will be applied within Information Operations (IO) 
activities.  This allows for an additional simplification and application of the final 
process.  Notwithstanding the reduction, there must be taken into account a certain level 
of implied tasks that are critical to all missions.  The command staff and associated 
friendly forces should be familiar with these concepts through both tenure and training.  
That is not to say that forthright communication will not be required to ensure that all 
allied commanders are in agreement to the mission at hand; however, many of the 
fundamental concepts that are true within all mission contexts can be exclude from the 
plan (Figure 3).  The final operational order will not convey every single aspect of what 
can or cannot be performed in the mission, as these concepts should already be 
understood (Table 5).  Essential tasks are tasks that must be addressed within the 
communication in order for the mission to succeed.  These tasks are included in the 
planning and documentation process to ensure the proper dissemination of 








                                                 
49 Joint Information Operations Planning Handbook.  Joint Forces Staff College Joint Command, 
Control and Information Operations School. (September 2009), IV-149-150. 
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Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) 
Step 1: Initiation 
Step 2: Mission Analysis 
Step 3: Course of Action (COA) Development 
Step 4: COA Analysis and Wargaming 
Step 5: COA Comparison 
Step 6: COA Selection and Approval 
Step 7: Plan or Order Development 
Table 5.   The Joint Operation Planning Process 50 
 
Figure 3.   Elements of Operational Design51 
                                                 
50 Joint Operation Planning: Joint Publication 5-0. (26 December 2006), III-20. 
51 Joint Operation Planning: Joint Publication 5-0. (26 December 2006), IV-5. 
 36 
1. Step One: Initiation 
The JOPP begins with the initiation step.  The process is set into motion in 
response to a real or perceived threat by an authority assigned responsibility to engage 
military support.  In some cases, the threat may not have an active adversarial threat 
agent, but the probability of the threat agent materializing to drive the threat is highly 
probable in the future.  The threat may also possess only a moderate probably, but the 
impact of an adversarial force taking this course of action would be catastrophic.  In any 
case, the process is created in response to a request by the hierarchy over the commander 
to address a perceived need.  It is important to note that the Initiation and Mission 
Analysis steps may be combined in some situations, as well as the COA Comparison and 
Approval.  
2. Step Two: Mission Analysis 
Mission analysis conveys the purpose, actions, and reasoning regarding the 
situation that brought about the initiation of the planning process.  This involves the 
adversarial Centers of Gravity (COG) and the corresponding events that have led to this 
action.  The situation that led to the decision for initiation of the JOPP and the mission 
details are outlined and disseminated to the concerned parties.  This will include enough 
information to build sufficient situational awareness regarding known facts, upcoming 
tasks, operational limitations, the desired end state, risk assessments, and initial staffing 
estimates (Table 6).  The mission statement will capture the goal of the operation with the 








Mission Analysis Sub-Steps 
Determine known facts, current status, or conditions 
Analyze the higher commander’s mission and intent 
Determine own specified, implied, and essential tasks 
Determine operational limitations 
Develop assumptions 
Determine own military end state, objectives, and initial effects 
Determine own & enemy’s center(s) of gravity and critical factors 
Determine initial commander’s critical information requirements 
Review strategic communication guidance (when applicable) 
Conduct initial force structure analysis 
Conduct initial risk assessment 
Develop mission statement 
Develop mission analysis brief 
Prepare initial staff estimates 
Publish commander’s planning guidance and initial intent 
 
Simplified Sub-Steps 
1) What is the current state? 
 Determine the current state 
2) What is the desired state? 
 Interpret the mission, intent, and desired end state 
3) How will the desired state be achieved? 
• Identify enemy COGs 
• Develop objectives (MOEs and MOPs) 
• Conduct initial force structure analysis 
• Conduct initial risk assessment 
• Prepare initial staff estimate 
• Create mission statement 
Table 6.   Mission Analysis Sub-Steps52 53 (Steps Not Necessarily Sequential) 
                                                 
52 Joint Operation Planning: Joint Publication 5-0. (26 December 2006), III-21. 
53 Joint Operation Planning: Joint Publication 5-0. (26 December 2006), IV-5. 
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a. Center of Gravity (COG) 
Possibly, the most important aspect of Mission Analysis is the 
determination of allied and enemy Centers of Gravity (COG).  The enemy’s center of 
gravity is “the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of 
action or will to act.”54  An adversary’s COG is usually described by the intelligence 
units assigned to conduct the investigation.  The importance of establishing the 
adversarial, and friendly COGs lies within the hierarchy of Critical Capabilities (CC), 
Critical Requirements (CR), and Critical Vulnerabilities (CV) from which the objectives 
that will both protect allied force COGs and destroy enemy COGs will be created (Figure 
4).  Critical capabilities are the physical, cognitive, or informational assets that enable an 
adversarial or allied force to achieve their COG.  Critical requirements are the conditions 
that must exist for the critical capabilities to operate effectively.  Critical vulnerabilities 
involve aspects of the CRs that are exposed to attack. 
                                                 
54 Joint Operation Planning: Joint Publication 5-0. (26 December 2006). 
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Figure 4.   COG Analysis Hierarchy55 
The proper determination of both the allied and adversarial COGs are 
critical to the effective planning of attack and protection measures.  A poorly planned 
operation will not adequately identify COGs, causing the improper allocation of force 
resources to ineffective means.  The improper allocation of military, economic, 
diplomatic, or psychological force will lead to unnecessary expenditures and an increased 
loss of life.  This is not to say that planning will be complete.  There will be missing bits 
of information for which the planner will need to make assumptions.  The assumptions, if 
not properly validated, become risks. 
 
                                                 
55 Edward Fisher, Center of Gravity Analysis (slideshow), Naval Postgraduate School, Course 
IO4300, 2010. 
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This process is taken into consideration through specified, implied, and 
essential tasks.  Specified tasks are those objectives that have been handed down by a 
higher command.  The implied tasks are objectives that are a dependency for the stated 
objective.  Finally, the essential tasks are those goals that must be achieved for the 
mission to be a success.  The essential tasks are recorded in the mission statement. 
Throughout the planning process, risk analysis is conducted regarding the 
allied vulnerabilities, potential threats to these vulnerabilities, the likelihood of 
occurrence of the stated threat, and the impact of a successful adversarial exploitation of 
the identified vulnerabilities.  Decisions will be made to mitigate, transfer, avoid, or 
accept the risk associated with the operation.  In some cases, the risk will need to be 
accepted without much consideration to countermeasures.  This is not the most preferred 
situation, but it is a requirement to maintain the agility of battle operations.  
 41 
COG Analysis Methodology56 
b.  Mission Statement 
One of the key outputs of the Mission Analysis step is creation of a 
mission statement, the initial planning guidance, and Critical Commander’s Intelligence 
Requirements (CCIR).  A good mission statement covers five key questions regarding the 
mission: who, what, when, where, and why.  This is to the exclusion of the “how” 
question.  The method by which the mission will be conducted to specifically achieve the 
desired end state is not discussed within the mission statement.  The statement should 
include a rough estimate of staffing and planning for a generally expected Course of 
Action (COA).  This will include a discussion of the enemy Centers of Gravity (COG) 
 
                                                 
56 Joint Pub 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning, ll-6 and ll-11; 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctorine/jel/doddict/index.html; Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities by Dr. 
Joe Strange (Marine Corps University Foundation, Quantico, Virginia, 1996). 
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and the timing in which the operation should be conducted.  Additional reference to the 
Rules of Engagement (ROE) and the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) will also be 
covered to an acceptable level of detail. 
From an operational standpoint, there are three questions that must be 
answered: 1) What is the current state?, 2) What is the desired state?, and 3) How will the 
desired state be achieved?  These questions frame the entirety of the mission in a form 
that can be easily conveyed to personnel situated in any location.  Communicating a 
simple statement answering each of these questions will allow the intent and process to 
be delivered in an understandable format that will facilitate more expedient 
comprehension of the mission to be accomplished. 
3.  Step Three: Course of Action (COA) Development 
The most important step within the JOPP is the development of the COA.  
Generally, three COAs will be developed, including contingency actions which address 
unexpected or alternative situations.  At this point of the process, the process will address 
the specific circumstances surrounding the who, what, when, where, why and how 
questions detailing how the mission will be conducted.  The first three courses of action 
will offer alternative viewpoints on how the mission could be accomplished.  This must 
include the actions, concepts, time estimates, and success criteria.  The objectives, 
effects, actions, resources, and risks are thoroughly discussed and documented within the 
process.  They must be performed within with respect to the “restraints,” activities that 
must not be conducted, and the “constraints,” activities that must be conducted for the 
success of the mission.  There are numerous opportunities that may arise that will not be 
available for action due to the restraints surrounding the operational environment.  The 
general concepts and specific actions should be documented and communicated 
appropriately, according to the level of acceptable risk.  After thoughtful design, COAs 




Valid Course of Action 
Adequate — Can accomplish the mission within the commander’s guidance. 
Feasible — Can accomplish the mission within the established time, space, and resource 
limitations. 
Acceptable — Must balance cost and risk with the advantage gained. 
Distinguishable — Must be sufficiently different from the other courses of action. 
Complete — Must incorporate: 
• objectives, effects, and tasks to be performed 
• major forces required 
• concepts for deployment, employment, and sustainment 
• time estimates for achieving objectives 
• military end state and mission success criteria 
Table 7.   Valid Course of Action57 
It is important to note that within the context of information operations planning as 
integrated into the joint operation planning process, there is significant discussion about 
the effect that the process will incur on the physical, cognitive, and informational spheres.  
The action-reaction model allows for forces to plan their own operations, while being 
mindful of adversarial actions.  The goal is to establish an understanding of how and 
when information must flow within the battle space in order for allied and enemy 
commanders to make educated decisions.  The circular process begins within the physical 
realm with the action itself.  The action is relayed to the information realm where data are 
collected, processed, and disseminated.  Afterwards, it enters the cognitive phase where 
situational awareness and decision-making take place.  This brings the forces back into 
the information realm where the data are processed and then disseminated.  The process 
ends with the next action that the force will make relevant to the changes in the battle 
space (Figure 5). 
                                                 
57 Joint Operation Planning: Joint Publication 5-0. (26 December 2006), III-28. 
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Figure 5.   Action-Reaction Model58 
IO integration into JOPP also allows for a more specific view of COA 
development in relation to the specific steps that should be taken to achieve a set of goals.  
The process is augmented to include objectives, effects, and tasks.  Objectives are allied 
goals required to achieve the mission’s end state.  Effects describe what type of behavior 
should be exhibited within the battle space.  Tasks are the specific actions that are taken 








“IO EFFECT = TARGET + IMPACT ON A SYSTEM OR BEHAVIOR” 59 
The generation of IO Effects within the mission scope involves the “What,” 
“Who,” “Why” of the objective.  The “How” concept is addressed during the 
                                                 
58 Joint Information Operations Planning Handbook.  Joint Forces Staff College Joint Command, 
Control and Information Operations School. (September 2009), IV-169. 
59 Joint Information Operations Planning Handbook.  Joint Forces Staff College Joint Command, 
Control and Information Operations School, September 2009, IV-173. 
 45 
development of the IO Tasks.60  Successful IO Effect determination requires a clear 
understanding of what is to be accomplished, how it will be measured, and the 
synchronization of forces that will make it happen (Table 8).  The incorporation of 
multiple forces to accomplish a single stated goal can be better facilitated through this 
process when the plan is created with the outcome in mind. 
The force tasked with creating the desired IO Effect should understand Measures 
of Performance (MOP) versus Measures of Effectiveness (MOE).  MOP is the 
completion of a subset of tasks that must be accomplished within the scope of ordinary 
work.  A MOP for the distribution of leaflets over a foreign city could be relevant to the 
number of leaflets dropped in a certain time period, the number of jams that occurred in 
the distribution system, the quantity of personnel that were required to conduct the 
operation, etcetera.  The MOP does not indicate that the desired IO Effect was generated.  
There is no indication that the targeted population changed a behavioral pattern, such as 
surrendering, in the light of the measurement provided to the command.  A report of 
100,000 leaflets demanding surrender of the adversarial forces that were dropped over a 
thousand square miles of enemy territory does not convey the success or failure of the IO 
Effect.  This does indicate that the forces were successful in conducting their job as 
expected without significant impedance. 
To convey the accomplishment of a desired outcome requires the clear 
communication of the final objective and the MOE.  The MOE relates the process that 
was conducted and the result.  One hundred thousand leaflets demanding surrender of 
adversarial forces that were dropped, and 48 percent of the forces surrendered is an 
example of a MOE.  In this case, the effect of the dropped leaflets on the targeted 
population is reported.  This allows the commander to adjust the specifics of the 
operation to better achieve the desired effect.  In this case, the commander must be made 
aware of the MOP that the leaflets were successfully dropped, and also the MOE, that the 
message on the leaflets had the intended effect.  If the forces had failed to drop the 
prescribed number of leaflets over the target area, the MOE may have been affected by 
                                                 
60 Edward Fisher. IO4300, July 2010. 
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the lack of leaflets or the message.  It would be unknown if the failure was related to the 
unsuccessful task or if the message on the leaflet was ineffective. 
 
The proper development of IO Tasks involves the 
following steps 
Step 1) Select the target 
• Center of Gravity 
• Commander’s Objective 
• Cognitive Dimension 
• Information Dimension 
• Physical Dimension 
Step 2) Determine the desired action that will make the 












Step 3) Relate the purpose of the action to the desired 
outcome 
Step 4) Assign a resource to complete the task 
Table 8.   IO Tasks 
4.  Step Four: COA Analysis and Wargaming 
COA analysis and wargaming takes the proposed courses of action and places 
them into a battle scenario.  Each plan is tested by the allied forces who assume roles as 
an enemy “red cell” or an allied “blue cell.”  This allows the forces to conduct a 
simulated battle using actual command decisions and retaliation.  The simulation will 
expose weaknesses in allied force actions as the enemy force retaliates.  Creative 
responses to the simulated enemy retaliations can be incorporated into additional mission 
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capabilities or used to adjust or create new COAs, as desired. For more information, the 
IO Cell Actions and Outcomes as part of Joint Planning Packet appears in Appendix A. 
The staff follows nine steps during the wargaming process:61 
• Organize for the War game. 
• List all friendly forces. 
• List and review enemy forces, ECOAs, and outstanding RFIs. 
• Review assumptions. 
• List known critical events. 
• Determine Governing Factors. 
• Select the war game method. 
• Record and display results. 
• War game the operation and assess the results. 
5.  Step Five: COA Comparison 
The comparison step of the process places the COAs against the final mission 
objective, not one another.  COAs are not compared with other COAs, but the outcome of 
the wargaming and analysis of each COA to achieve the end state is considered.  The 
desire is to find the COA that minimizes risk, allows for future operations, has the 
maximum flexibility and agility for addressing unexpected threats and opportunities, and 
pushes the ability for individual initiative to subordinates whenever possible.  
Subordinate commands should have the ability to take personal initiative to accomplish 
the stated goals and exploit new opportunities whenever possible.  This allows for the 
continued development of the leadership and forces, and the ability to take advantage of 
unexpected opportunities that may arise within the battle space. 
6. Step Six: COA Selection and Approval 
The course of action selected for submission to the higher command is relevant to 
the interpretation of the analysis and comparison results by the subordinate command.  
                                                 
61 Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) Workbook. NWC 4111H. (JMO Department, Naval War 
College, 21 January 2008), 3-3. 
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The staff may use a decision matrix or other selection criteria, but the final decision will 
be based on the conscious decision by the commander in regards to the ability to 
accomplish the goal with the stated COA.  This process may involve the selection of 
more than one COA to the higher command, in order to either compensate for expected 
changes in the battle space, or to provide an alternate plan based on the commander’s 
personal estimate, experience, and judgment (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6.   Course of Action Approval62 
                                                 
62 Joint Operation Planning: Joint Publication 5-0. (26 December 2006), III-30. 
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7.  Step Seven: Plan or Order Development 
The final step is the creation of a plan or order that will be communicate to 
subordinate and collaborating organizations and components.  The subject matter experts 
will be acquired to accomplish the IO objective creation and task orders. 
C.  CONCLUSION 
The JOPP allows for the comprehensive creation and evaluation of actions to 
meet the operational objectives.  The coordination and collaboration with allied 
commands and related components is improved through the increased synchronization 
that is achieved through following the JOPP.  Information Operations concepts augment 
this process to the extent that it may be correlated to enterprise security planning.  As the 
allied and adversarial centers of gravity become more pronounced through the process, 
the capabilities on which they rely can be more easily identified.  As in enterprise 
security planning, this allows for the exposure of the critical requirements and associated 
vulnerabilities.  The JOPP, in its many variations, provides an excellent planning 
framework to achieve both military and civilian operational objectives. 
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IV.   ENTERPRISE INFORMATION SECURITY FRAMEWORK 
DEVELOPMENT 
It is not uncommon for the implementation of a thorough security framework such 
as CobiT or the ISO 27001 to take years of planning and design.63  Enterprise security 
should have a process that allows a management team to address the critical 
vulnerabilities affecting the firm’s centers of gravity both rapidly and effectively.  It is 
currently reported that over 100,000 new websites are discovered that harbor viruses 
every day.64  The threat landscape surrounding organizations can change far too rapidly 
for such delays to be acceptable within the information security industry.  The changes 
that can take place in as little as eighteen months can bring about a complete paradigm 
shift of how business and regulatory compliance is accomplished.  Remote web access, 
tablet computers, smart-phones, smart-vehicles, usb-powered computers, and other 
systems present new capabilities and threats to corporate viability.  Possessing a 
framework that allows for the flexibility to utilize existing management systems, the 
agility to address emerging threats, and the speed required to provide adequate protection 
against new threats is required. 
The development of a framework that takes into account the many varied aspects 
of business acumen, as well as, the expert skill of a security professional is one of the 
primary outputs that can be initiated after thorough study of the public and private 
industrial planning processes and frameworks.  In the following section, discussion will 
center around the key components of the JOPP as interpreted for the needs of enterprise 
security.  Offensive measures are relegated to the legal statutes already in place within 
the country that exercises malicious intent against the corporate assets.  Many 
methodologies have approached these tasks with overwhelming complexity.  One of the 
                                                 
63 Charles Robb, “Desperately Seeking Security Frameworks – A Roadmap for State CIOs,” 
NASCIO. March 2009, Accessed July 17 2011. http://www.nascio.org/publications/documents/NASCIO-
SecurityFrameworks.pdf. 
64 “Cyveillance testing finds AV vendors detect on average less than 19% of malware attacks,” 4 
August 2010, http://www.cyveillance.com/web/news/press_rel/2010/2010-08-04.asp (accessed 17 August 
2011). 
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primary goals of implementing the JOPP into enterprise security planning is to reduce 
complexity, providing a straightforward process that will define and address the most 
important objectives to the firm. 
A.  OVERVIEW 
Enterprise security planning must be seen more in the context of a battlefield than 
in that of a business.  Business systems are created within fixed laws, rules, and 
regulations.  There are expected codes of conduct and prudent judgment that can be relied 
upon for decisions.  There are situations within the business world where both sides can 
come to a mutually beneficial agreement.  Business is about the provision of services to 
those that wish to possess them in a way that benefits both parties.  This is in contrast to 
war or conflict, in which one nation or actor threatens or displays aggressive actions to 
another.  The enemy may attack outside of regular business hours, using channels outside 
of normal business operations.  To damage the sales revenue of a product line, the enemy 
may attack the support staff or knock out the electricity surrounding the service 
providers.  False statements may flood the Internet and media regarding product or 
service failures.  The development of an information security program that is capable of 
supporting business operations while disrupting adversarial attempts to damage the firm’s 
revenue falls outside of the scope of business as usual.  Information security is more 
battlefield than business, and the objectives therein must be conducted as such. 
In forming the plan of a campaign, it is requisite to foresee everything the 
enemy may do, and to be prepared with the necessary means to counteract 
it. Plans of campaign may be modified, ad infinitum, according to 
circumstances; the genius of the general, the character of the troops, and 
the topography of the theater of action.65 
The JOPP can be used for general enterprise security development, as well as, 
targeted employment of systems to mitigate specific threats.  In the most general 
application, the JOPP provides guidance for Strategic Direction (Business Strategy), 
Force Structure (Staffing), and Command and Control (Strategic Communications).  The 
                                                 
65 Napoleon. Napoleon’s Maxims of War: Maxim II (1831). 
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military already has established a rigid organizational hierarchy and culture.  
Corporations must establish the mission, staffing, and method of garnering support 
through communications in order to meet their operational and production goals.  In this 
preliminary phase, a corporate entity would ask three basic questions: 1) What is the 
current state?, What is the desired state?, and How will the firm achieve the desired state?  
In these questions, the firm’s strategy, staffing, communications, and production goals 
are reviewed and discussed in relation to the market limitations and associated risks.  
Enterprise security planning will take place within the context of an already established 
firm, integrating into the business operations in the most transparent way possible. 
The key to operational design essentially involves (1) understanding the strategic 
guidance (determining the end state and objectives); (2) identifying the adversary‚ 
principal strengths and weaknesses; and (3) developing an operational concept that will 
achieve strategic and operational objectives.66 
It is the goal of a good information security program to maintain invisibility to 
internal and external operations, except when it intends to coerce action through its own 
visibility.  When information security programs choose to be visible, it should most often 
be in the role of a deterrent, not in the prevention, detection, or response roles.  The 
prevention, detection, and response operations should be quietly accomplished with 
minimal impact to the firm’s public or private image.  If a response to an attack is 
acknowledged publicly or within the organization’s own network, it should be 
disseminated through a strategic communication that will be used to accomplish the 
desired deterrent effect. 
B.  JOPP: PLANNING FUNCTIONS 
To develop a good enterprise information security program, many of the steps 
outlined within the JOPP can be effectively used.  These steps can be interpreted into 
phases aimed at achieving a specific goal.  Earlier, the general aspects of the JOPP were 
interpreted for general business use.  At this point, the specific steps relevant to enterprise 
security planning will be detailed using both the overall JOPP strategic function and the 
                                                 
66 Joint Operation Planning: Joint Publication 5-0. (26 December 2006), xvii.  
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specific JOPP steps.  This chart correlates the requirements for enterprise security relative 
to the overall JOPP planning functions (see Table 9). 
 
JOPP: Planning Functions 
1. Strategic Guidance. 
2. Concept Development. 
3. Plan Development. 




Enterprise Security: Planning Functions 
1. Strategic Alignment. 
2. Risk Management. 
3. Concept Development. 
4. Senior Management Communication and 
Advocacy. 
5. Policy Development. 
Table 9.   JOPP: Planning Functions67 and Enterprise Security Planning Functions 
As can be seen within the chart, the JOPP provides similar strategic functions to 
those that would be needed within any enterprise security governance program.  These 
steps bear some resemblance to concepts common within project management or general 
enterprise governance.  The importance of these similarities are not fully realized within 
the general JOPP planning functions, but within the specific steps.  In this case, the JOPP 
planning functions provide a foundational understanding illustrating the complete 
integration into the Joint Operation Planning Process.  There is not a complete correlation 
between the two concepts, but the similarities are of great use to further planning. 
The enterprise security planning functions deviate from the standard JOPP in 
strategic alignment, risk management, and communication.  Within the corporate 
environment, security management is not the core purpose of the business.  Even within 
the security industry itself, security firms do not have a primary mission of becoming 
secure and maintaining security.  The corporation’s primary mission is to provide a 
product or service.  This product or service may be for profit or entirely free, as in a 
philanthropic endeavor; nonetheless, the mission is to produce some solution for some 
market.  Therefore, the “Strategic Guidance” aspect of the JOPP is replaced with 
 
 
                                                 
67 Joint Operation Planning: Joint Publication 5-0. (26 December 2006), I-15 to I-16. 
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“Strategic Alignment.”  This is because the firm already exists with a purpose other than 
being secure, and the enterprise security function must provide protection for the 
production of a product or service. 
In the military environment, communication channels are more strictly defined 
and are often delegated to a communication officer or conducted within a formal process.  
The corporate design requires a more simplistic model that provides for open 
communications between the security officer and the senior management representatives.  
In this case, the security officer notifies the higher command echelons of the need to 
initiate a formal plan in response to a risk analysis.  The risk assessment is conducted 
with only a cursory analysis of the firm’s assets and centers of gravity.  An in-depth 
analysis will be conducted within the formal planning process.  At this point, the senior 
management team must then be persuaded that the mission objectives are within the best 
interests of the firm.  Once the security officer has approval to engage in the requisite 
planning process, policies are developed for the firm.  This process deviates slightly from 
the concept development portion of the JOPP to include risk management as a 
prerequisite.  This is required, as the security officer will be responsible for both the 
initiation, development, and policies to mitigate risks, as well as, persuading the firm to 
invest the resources required for the program. 
C.  ENTERPRISE SECURITY USING THE JOPP 
The overall planning process developed in this research entitled, Enterprise 
Security Planning Process (ESPP) is adjusted to meet the more confined needs of a 
corporate security environment.  For instance, “Step 1: Initiation” will be interpreted as 
part of the strategic guidance within the organizational needs of the firm and will be 
combined with portions of “Step 2.”  “Step 2: Mission Analysis” will be reduced and 
subdivided into multiple aspects of both the organizational and departmental goals.  
There will also be a combination of the individual COA development, analysis, 
comparison steps, into one phase.  Each of the steps will be evaluated based on the 
urgency and importance of the action.  “Step 6: COA Approval” will be restated to 
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“Program Approval and Budgeting,” leaving “Step 7: Plan or Order Development” to be 
interpreted as an implementation and acquisition phase. 
This modifies the JOPP to a new form providing for the following phases: 
Initiation, Program Analysis, Planning, Approval and Budgeting, Acquisition and 
Implementation, and Auditing and Revision.  Providing this simple framework allows for 
a reduction in the complexity often experienced when addressing enterprise security 
while leveraging the maturity of the JOPP.  The actual policies and procedures involved 
in securing the firm involve much greater detail and varied levels of expertise for 
implementation.  The Joint Operation Planning Process and the Enterprise Security 
Planning Process are presented in the included chart (see Table 10). 
 
Joint Operation Planning Process 
(JOPP) 
Step 1: Initiation 
Step 2: Mission Analysis 
Step 3: COA Development 
Step 4: COA Analysis and Wargaming 
Step 5: COA Comparison 
Step 6: COA Selection and Approval 
Step 7: Plan or Order Development 
Enterprise Security Planning Process 
(ESPP) 
Phase 1: Initiation 
Phase 2: Program Analysis 
Phase 3: Planning 
Phase 4: Approval and Budgeting 
Phase 5: Acquisition and Implementation 
Phase 6: Auditing and Revision 
Table 10.   JOPP68 and ESPP 
1.  Phase One: Initiation 
The JOPP provides for an initiation step that is the result of an actual or perceived 
threat against a national interest.  Initiation, as seen in the JOPP, is the result of a formal 
process delegated by a higher command.  Enterprise security departments are faced with 
continual threats from multiple agents on an ongoing basis.  The purpose of the 
department is to protect the firm’s assets from unauthorized disclosure, alteration, or 
destruction.  These units are concerned with providing confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of firm resources at all times, recommending the initiation of protective 
                                                 
68 Joint Operation Planning: Joint Publication 5-0. (26 December 2006), III-20. 
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controls as the result of a self-imposed audit, external audit, incident, or regulation.  In 
most, if not all, of the cases mentioned, the enterprise security unit initiates the process.  
As such, there is a deviation from the standard interpretation of the JOPP’s initiation to 
relegate the initiation from within enterprise security itself. 
In the preliminary portion of the Initiation Phase, alignment must be achieved 
with the core purposes of the organization.  Within this context, strategic communications 
are planned to convey the purpose of the initiative and continually reinforce the 
organizational mission.  Strategic communications vary from normal daily discussions in 
the following ways.  First, strategic communications are defined by scope.  This can 
mean that the communications are conducted intentionally through micro, mezzo, or 
macro social contexts or simply by the generality or specificity of the message.  These 
contexts can remain within the firm or they may involve a small segment of customers, 
all customers, or the entire public.  Next, strategic communications are developed with 
short-term and long-term objectives in mind.  These objectives take into account the 
message and the desired outcome.  If the message was to provide immediate attention to a 
well-known security risk facing the firm, then a short-term impact would be expected 
within the organization as employees take the appropriate measures detailed within the 
communiqué.  If the communication’s goal is to alter the public perception regarding the 
negative environmental impact of a new competitor’s product line, then the 
communications would require additional measures of performance to be defined to 
gauge the staff’s workload and adequate measures of effectiveness to gauge the impact of 
the message itself. 
The next task within the initiation phase is to properly identify roles and 
responsibilities within the department and enterprise.  There must be a clear definition of 
both who is responsible for each security task and what that responsibility entails.  
Security awareness, planning, incident response, corporate continuity, disaster recovery, 
and other responsibilities are often neglected due to a failure to properly define and 
assign the responsibility appropriately.  This is especially important during the initiation 
phase of the process to allow for a solid mission to be defined. 
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Throughout the initiation phase, the policies created within the foundational base 
planning functions of the enterprise security program should be reviewed for direction 
and propriety.  Many of the policies may have been changed since the program was last 
initiated, causing a lack within the references to adequate controls and processes.  This 
can lead to the creation of new policies, the revision of old policies, or the acquisition of 
additional details that may have been missed during the initiation. 
Most of the objectives taken in response to either a potential threat or in response 
to an actual threat to firm operations are proposed by the enterprise security office itself.  
In the case of prevention, the security planning process follows the JOPP in a more 
controlled fashion, allowing for a more thorough and tested solution.  In the event of an 
actual threat, the process is more similar to JOPP crisis action planning.  In both cases, 
the JOPP provides a process that can be followed in varied levels of detail.  Most often, a 
plan or process will already exist to manage the crisis as it is encountered simply due to 
the experiences of the security officer.  In some cases, a new threat will take action 
against an unplanned vulnerability and will require a more dedicated and detailed 
response plan to be immediately developed. 
 Example Objectives: 
• Security Awareness 
• Identification and Removal of Critical Vulnerabilities 
• System Hardening (removal of unused services, installation of 
patches and updates) 
• Regular Background Investigations 
• Regulatory Compliance 
• Adequate Archival Systems 
2.  Phase Two: Program Analysis 
The first step in program analysis is the discovery of physical, information, and 
employee assets that may be negatively affected by adversarial attacks.  This is a skill, 
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asset, and process inventory designed to allow the enterprise security office to properly 
define the risks posed by various threat agents internally and externally to the firm.  The 
impact of these assets to strategic firm operations is determined to identify which assets 
are the most critical to the organization. 
These assets will be used in conjunction with the strategic alignment to firm 
operations to identify the most critical assets within the organization.  This is 
accomplished using the JOPP model’s reference to centers of gravity. 
a.  Centers of Gravity 
The application of the military context to the business context is 
appropriate in this case due to the adversarial situations presented to a firm’s security.  
Threats to an enterprise are not isolated to market conditions, customer satisfaction, or 
the competition.  In addition to regulatory codes, the enterprise security office must 
mitigate situations arising from individual criminal actions, concerted acts by criminal 
organizations, legal and civil issues surrounding foreign governments and firms, 
fraudulent activities funding terrorist organizations, malicious hackers, and malevolent 
programs.  This allows the battlefield context of the JOPP to become more easily related 
to enterprise security functions. 
The centers of gravity for an organization can be related to the firm’s core 
competency, core purpose, organizational mission, or key product and service offerings.  
This is closely related to the concept of allied and adversarial COGs as defined within a 
battle context.  The COG is composed of critical capabilities, critical requirements, and 
the related critical vulnerabilities affecting them.  An example of this situation is 






Example COG Analysis 
 
COG = Provide Expert Investment Advice 
 
CC = Highly Skilled Advisors 
CC = Fast and Reliable Technology 
CC = Efficient Business Process 
 
CR = Personnel: Management 
CR = Personnel: Advisors 
CR = Personnel: Support Staff 
CR = Personnel: Technical Staff 
 
CR = Technology: Workstations 
CR = Technology: Servers 
CR = Technology: Internet 
CR = Technology: Network 
CR = Technology: Software 
CR = Technology: Production Data 
CR = Technology: Sensitive Data 
 
CV = Personnel: Physical Unavailability 
CV = Personnel: Physical, Psychological, or 
Emotional Incapacitation 
CV = Technology: Unauthorized Disclosure 
CV = Technology: Unauthorized Alteration 
CV = Technology: Unauthorized Destruction 
CV = Technology: Performance Disruption 






Figure 7.   Center of Gravity 
b.  Risk Assessment 
The risk assessment becomes much more effective when used within the 
context of a proper analysis of the organization’s centers of gravity.  The organization’s 
COGs allow for a quick determination of the risks facing each facet of the firm’s primary 
functions.  Without a COG analysis the strategic alignment is measured against prevalent 
threats facing the firm.  These threats are then measured against the firm’s individual 
productivity in an ad-hoc or formally defined expository manner.  After conducting even 
a rudimentary COG analysis, the vulnerabilities to actual firm operations can be far more 
understood.  
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Risk assessments are part of the fundamental function of an enterprise 
security office.69  The allocation of proper preventive measures will usually be 
determined by a formal quantitative or qualitative risk assessment process.  If a 
quantitative risk analysis is possible, then a dollar-for-dollar comparison of the cost of an 
attack against the cost of prevention measures is taken into consideration.  This takes into 
consideration the Single-Loss Expectancy (SLE), Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE), and 
the Annual Rate of Occurrence (ARO).70  If the financial impact of the materialization of 
a threat is considered to be more than the cost to protect the systems against the threat, 
then the preventive solution is employed.  If the financial implications for implementing 
the protection mechanisms outweigh the cost of a threat action, then the risk is accepted.  
This calculation must take into consideration the full projected cost of the protection 
mechanism, depreciation of the mechanism, and the annualized cost of an attack 
materializing against a known exposure.  It is rarely possible to predict the public 
backlash created by an attack.  The opportunity costs and relevant costs of the attack will 
impact more aspects of firm operations than can be easily identified.  This makes the 
quantitative a popular theoretical approach to enterprise security management, but rarely 
does it meet the expectations of reality. 
Having attempted to gain a quantitative risk analysis for the firm’s 
operations with little success, most organizations will turn to a qualitative analysis 
method.  This method allows the ascription of a value of any number, one through five, 
for example, to the likelihood of a realized threat with a similar assignment for the impact 
to firm operations in relation to the cost of prevention mechanisms. 
 
                                                 
69 Douglas J Landoll, The Security Risk Assessment Handbook: A Complete Guide for Performing 
Security Risk Assessments (New York, New York: Auerbach Publications, 2006), 11. 
70 Ronald L. Krutz and Russell Dean Vines, The CISSP Prep Guide: Gold Edition (Indianapolis, 
Indiana: Wiley Publishing, 2003), 18. 
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Non-JOPP Example: 
  Incident: 
   SPAM. Without preventive measures, it is expected that 
   the firm will receive 180,000 to 250,000 SPAM messages 
   per day. This equates to roughly 150-200 messages per 
   day for each user account. 
 
  Key: 
   Threat Expectancy: 
    1 = Unlikely 
    5 = Almost Certain 
 
   Impact if Ignored 
    1 = Unnoticed 
    5 = Catastrophic 
 
  Assessment: 
   Threat Expectancy = 5 
   Impact if Ignored = 3 
   Cost of Prevention = 1 
 
  Proposal: 
   Due to the negligible cost of the prevention mechanism 
   in relation to the extreme likelihood of the occurrence 
   of the attack in combination with the detrimental impact 
   to firm operations, it is recommended that this 
   preventive mechanism is implemented. 
 
c.  JOPP Benefit to Risk Assessment 
This process can be more clearly defined using the centers of gravity to 
understand the actual impact to firm operations.  In the case of SPAM, an impact will be 
felt to the aforementioned core mission of “providing expert investment advice.”  It can 
be seen from the COG analysis that SPAM is a threat facing a performance vulnerability.  
The performance vulnerability will, in this case, affect the servers.  This affects the fast 
and reliable technology capability, resulting in a failure to provide timely investment 
advice.  The straightforward approach outlined in the JOPP through use of the COG 
analysis and development will allow the security office to better communicate the 
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importance of the threat to the senior management, more easily gain funding, and more 
directly protect against an adversarial process affecting the core mission of the firm. 
3.  Phase Three: Planning 
The planning phase involves the research of potential solutions, the development 
of appropriate courses of action, and the construction of a timetable for the 
communication and implementation portions of the Enterprise Security Planning Process 
(ESPP).  The investigation surrounding possible solutions within the technical 
environment is quite daunting.  Technical capabilities are doubling faster than every 
eighteen months.  This rapidly changing environment requires that the architect tasked 
with discovering viable solutions to meet the mission objectives must be continuously 
observing the market and gaining new skills. 
The proper determination of a course of action, as referenced in the previous 
chapter, involves the distinct definition of a feasible action plan that can be completed 
within a defined time frame using a predetermined amount of force.  During the planning 
phase, the teams involved will need to conduct normal project management tasks to 
overcome fundamental challenges.  The project plans take place at a more detailed level 
than the ESPP, as such, the personnel involved will need to possess adequate skills, 
budget, time, and authority to affect the required changes. 
Communications are the fundamental building block of personal advocacy within, 
and outside, an organization.  Communications should be scheduled within the ESPP to 
notify the concerned parties of the initiation, timetable, progress, and complications 
during the execution of the initiative.  The type of communication should be crafted 
within the strategic purpose of the initiative and firm to allow feedback to occur.  
Feedback and attention to individual needs and desires will help prevent the backlash that 
can occur when personnel or teams resist a program.  The importance of friendly and 
persuasive language, framed in a strategic context, cannot be overemphasized.  
Neglecting the personal opinions of the affected parties will lead to inefficiencies and 
possibly even downright insubordination.  Proper communication will disarm the 
disgruntled personnel and encourage the involved staff to complete the task at hand. 
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Finally, the implementation should be scheduled with respect to the risk, cost, and 
personal interests of those involved.  This prevents an implementation from absorbing a 
twelve-hour workday during Christmas holidays, while paying twice the normal labor 
rates, all for a solution that could have waited another three months.  If key participants 
have personal conflicts that may affect the schedule adversely, a minor tweak in the 
scheduling will aid in the advocacy of those participants in the future. 
4.  Phase Four: Approval and Budgeting 
The approval phase is much like the JOPP COA Analysis, Wargaming, and 
Comparison steps.  In this phase, the courses of action are not only approved in 
methodology, but they must also meet budget requirements.  Security operations should 
be conducted within short time periods, preventing exploitation from known or perceived 
threats as quickly and effectively as possible.  This goal however, may run in contrast to 
recent market downturns or budgeting shortfalls.  In these cases the initiative may be 
denied in the current state due to budgetary reasons, but not in principle.  In this case, the 
initiative will need to be redesigned to fall within the budget limitations or the associated 
risks will need to be accepted until the budget is available.  This decision must be shared 
among senior management to avoid legal or personal liability caused by the stagnation of 
the initiative. 
5.  Phase Five: Acquisition and Implementation 
Once the program is approved and a budget is defined, the process turns to 
competitive quotes, shipping and training time frames, and implementation scheduling.  
At this point, the subject matter experts involved in each detailed aspect of the initiative 
will be summoned and allocated to the relevant project teams.  Enterprise security 
initiatives often require the participation of public relations, legal, compliance, 
information technology, human resources, and the specific departments affected by the 
change.  Once again, persuasive and friendly communication conducted early and often 
can speed the implementation and ease the internal and external backlash often associated 
with additional security control mechanisms or processes. 
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6.  Phase Six: Auditing and Revision 
After the initiative is complete, an audit will allow for a gap analysis to be 
conducted.  The gap analysis will summarize the difference between the initiative’s 
designed end-state and the actual end-state.71  In most cases, this is a small difference 
that can be corrected through a few minor projects.  In many cases, it is never formally 
addressed and causes inefficiency and system failure in complex environments.  In any 
case, the acknowledgement of a few minor imperfections or urgent modifications does 
not indicate a mission failure. 
This also includes a chance for lessons learned and revision to the systems or 
processes for future initiatives.72  Enterprise security offices will have a continuous 
bombardment of risks to address from existing and new product or service offerings, as 
well as, new and existing threats.  A safe and appropriate summary of the success and 
failure experienced during the initiative will aide in more effective and efficient 
initiatives in the future. 
D.  CONCLUSION 
The overall Enterprise Security Planning Process (ESPP) as instituted within the 
context of the JOPP can offer a mature and simple method by which an enterprise 
security office can manage operations.  A more complete representation of the enterprise 
security planning phases, as interpreted using the JOPP, is represented in the expanded 
chart (Table 11).  The detailed aspects contained within a normal security operation can 
be reviewed within the various appendices contained within this report. 
 
                                                 
71 Douglas J Landoll, The Security Risk Assessment Handbook: A Complete Guide for Performing 
Security Risk Assessments (New York, New York: Auerbach Publications, 2006). 
72 Joint Information Operations Planning Handbook.  Joint Forces Staff College Joint Command, 
Control and Information Operations School. (September 2009), IV-247-250. 
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Enterprise Security Planning Process: Overview 
 
Phase 1: Initiation 
• Strategic Alignment 
• Strategic Communication Planning (message + response, to 
whom?) 
• Define Roles and Ongoing Responsibilities 
• Policy Assessment 
 
Phase 2: Program Analysis 
• Define critical physical assets, information assets, and 
personnel 
• COG Analysis (CC, CR, CV) 
• Risk Assessment based on Centers of Gravity 
   
Phase 3: Planning 
• Investigate available solutions 
• Determine courses of action 
• Schedule communications 
• Schedule implementation 
 
Phase 4: Approval and Budgeting 
• Present potential courses of action 
• Gain support from senior management 
• Begin acquisition process 
   
Phase 5: Acquisition and Implementation 
• Begin communications campaign to inform and influence 
• Procure the requisite personnel, processes, or products 
 
Phase 6: Auditing and Revision 
• Internal 
• External 
• Initiation for new people, processes, or systems 
Table 12.   Enterprise Security Planning Process 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A.  THE SITUATION 
Current enterprise security planning methodologies are inadequate and 
inappropriate for managing the onslaught of threats facing organizations in such a rapidly 
changing adversarial landscape.  An implementation period of greater than eighteen 
months is woefully inadequate to produce the agility required for a doubling of attack 
vectors.  The concept of long-term planning within overly complex frameworks that offer 
solutions based on sixty to eighty percent compliance is antiquated, costly, and 
dangerous.  Both the threat landscape and the management structure change too quickly 
for a plan whose goal is eighty percent compliance within a three-year period.  Most 
frameworks will admit that no firm will be capable of a complete implementation.  The 
plans are designed to be continuously revised from core concepts to administrative 
process on a regular basis.  It is not viable to implement a plan to eighty percent 
effectiveness that will manage one hundred percent of the firm’s security exposure.  If 
this plan is then revised at the time that it achieves eighty percent effectiveness, the new 
level of compliance to the framework will be significantly less.  Each reevaluation of the 
system will result in a less capable program that leaves the core competencies of 
organizations exposed to malicious attack.  This reality has been demonstrated multiple 
times through data spillage that has occurred because of a failure to secure the most basic 
aspects of the firm’s resources.  The prevailing cause of these failures is the constant 
revision of a program that never reached full maturity during the initial implementation.  
Through constant changes in technology and management, the enterprise security 




B.  THE NEED FOR CHANGE 
Enterprise compliance, legal, and security operations often lose sight of the true 
firm objectives.  Each office has a tendency to see firm operations as a risk unto itself.  
These risks are mitigated to the detriment of actual business productivity.  The time 
required to understand and implement a framework is important.  The mentality that, in 
order to limit legal liability, a plan must address every conceivable occurrence of every 
possible threat through a list of over three hundred categories is preposterous.  Within the 
ever-changing corporate marketplace, time is of the essence, and the frameworks that are 
used must address this reality.  The age in which a product could take eighteen months in 
research and development before another year of manufacturing is gone.  This is also true 
for those that believe a comprehensive plan, spanning years of revision, is an acceptable 
time table.  If the strategy cannot be clearly delineated within the span of three months, 
the strategy is both excessively complex and ineffectual. 
Many states, including Delaware, Nevada, North Carolina, Tennessee, 
Washington, and Wisconsin have adopted ISO 27001 as their foundational 
or baseline security framework. States report that implementation of 
27001 frequently takes as much as a year of concerted effort, as associated 
policies, standards, and controls are established and put in place. While 
establishing follow-on compliance with the standards is a lengthier 
process, adoption of ISO 27001 is seen as a critical foundation for the 
security programs and for positioning programs for subsequent audits.73 
Discovering the centers of gravity within a firm, and the adversarial forces 
threatening the firm, are paramount.  This process should take no more than a few weeks 
of discussion with the key leadership of the organization.  If the senior management 
cannot identify the purpose of the firm within the period of a few weeks, then at the very 
least the process of reexamination has begun.  Determination of the organization’s center 
of gravity will involve the personnel responsible for both the leadership and daily 
operations of the firm.  It is important to demonstrate an understanding of the impact 
potential presented by the line staff in respectful communications that address their 
individual needs.  Morale has long been a concept relegated to military forces.  In the 
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private sector, morale is trumped by a positive bottom line.  Unfortunately, the 
ramifications of a loss of positive morale is difficult to translate to a loss in revenue.  At 
the very least, all strategic communications should address the goal of the message and 
its measure of effectiveness.  Unplanned communication becomes fodder for unrest, legal 
liability, morale issues, and confusion.  Respectfully addressing the concerns of 
management and staff in a direct, yet sympathetic, fashion, will aid in the implementation 
and management of every framework the firm may consider. 
C.  THE RIGHT MINDSET 
Over the last few chapters, various frameworks have been discussed with 
attention paid to the potential pitfalls of each.  A majority of the enterprise security 
frameworks suffer from a seemingly inescapable desire to completely immerse 
themselves into business as usual management and market practices.  This adherence to a 
form of business management intended for the legal provision of services or products in a 
security environment that must mitigate fraud, criminal activity, mischievous hackers, 
and even terrorists operations is short-sighted.  The JOPP is intended to address the same 
aspects of conflict that are addressed within a defensive enterprise security program.  
From hijacking, destruction of property, and the loss of leadership, to the malicious attack 
on the firm’s information resources and reputation, the JOPP presents itself adequate.  
The JOPP does not directly correlate with offensive operations as conducted within 
enterprise security programs, but there are still some lessons that transfer effectively.  
One such concept is the management of deterrence for an organization.  The potential for 
organizations to provide public statistics revealing the number of malicious attacks 
reported to law enforcement, or other third parties, should be instituted.  This type of 
deterrent would not posture the firm in an arrogant position, but an attentive one.  No 
organization should claim that it has achieved a level of perfection in regards to its 
security operations; however, every firm can convey that they have pursued and 
prosecuted malicious activities.  Deterrence is simply another example of how 
information operations as used through the JOPP can better secure the nation’s critical 
infrastructures. 
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The Enterprise Security Planning Process (ESPP) has been designed to integrate 
those aspects of the JOPP that are most useful for enterprise security operations.  This is 
not to say that this process is without exclusion or the need for revision, but the process 
presented will allow the rapid application of JOPP principles to firm operations.  This 
will reduce the implementation and training intervals, that are currently required for other 
prominent frameworks, from years to less than six months.  The process as delineated 
within this report should take a medium size firm 30 to 60 business days for complete 
initiation.  The specific tasks that are produced as a result of following the ESPP will take 
different lengths of time and various degrees of effort, but that would be expected with 
any specific detail. 
D.  IDEAS FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT 
Through the course of study, there were numerous opportunities for expansion 
related to this topic.  The first of these topics involves the proper modeling of strategic 
communication as seen through the context of information operations.  The Joint 
Doctrine for Information Operations74 provides a great deal of information that could be 
used within enterprise security offices and within the specific planning of security 
projects.  Next, the creation of a Joint Operation Planning and Execution System 
(JOPES) for private industry would allow firms to maintain a central repository of actions 
and effects based on the guiding principles of the JOPP.  This could be further developed 
to provide tightly integrated dashboards to address rapidly changing metrics within the 
firm.  This could also be a part of the development of management software and 
processes that would involve a checklist related to the principles referenced in the ESPP.  
These processes could then be relegated to the appropriate department and project teams 
for immediate feedback on the performance of the tasks and the effectiveness of the 
program as a whole. 
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In almost every case, the JOPP presented a mature solution that integrates fluidly 
with enterprise security operations.  The focus of the JOPP on military allied and 
adversarial actions is far more appropriate in security leadership than the prominent 
concepts of business administration.  This research has provided evidence that the JOPP 
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APPENDIX C 




 Legitimate External Entity: 
  Public Reprimand or Apology 
  Cessation of Business Affiliation 
  Cessation of Commerce to/from the offending firm 
  Civil Lawsuit 
  Criminal Lawsuit 
  Governmental Diplomatic Admonition 
  Governmental Economic Sanctions 
  Military Action 
 
 Illegal External Entity: 
  Public Disclosure of Criminal Activities 
  Provide Investigatory Resources to Law Enforcement 
  Governmental Diplomatic Involvement 
  Governmental Economic Sanctions 
  Military Action 
 
 Internal Personnel: 
  Reprimand 
  Termination of Employment 
  Civil Lawsuit 
  Criminal Lawsuit 
 
 External Vendors and Contractors: 
  Reprimand 
  Termination of Contract 
  Civil Lawsuit 




 Data and Application Security: 
  Database Permissions Management 
  Data Leak Prevention 
  Application Security (existing software) 
  Storage Security 
  Backup and Recovery 
  Security in Development Life Cycle (Change Control, Code Review) 
 80 
 Node Security: 
  OS Hardening 
  Antispyware 
  AntiVirus 
  Data-Leak/Loss Prevention (HDD, CDROM, USB, Memory Stick) 
  Encryption (Disk, Database, File) 
  Activity Monitoring/Logging 
  Mobile Device Security 
  Printer (HDD, External Access) 
  Intrusion Detection/Prevention System 
  Patch Management 
 
 
 Network Security: 
  AntiSpam Software 
  E-Mail Encryption 
  Anti-Virus (UTM) 
  Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems (UTM) 
  Network Monitoring/Logging 
  Firewall (UTM) 
  Virtual Private Network 
  Web Content Filtering 
  PKI/Digital SIGS/Certificates 
  Web Application Security 
  Wireless Security 
 
 
 Identity Management: 
  Access Control 
  Active Directory (two-factor) 
  Local Authority (two-factor) 
  Other two-factor application, node, service access 
  Single Sign-on 
  Password Management (IT tracking access and passwords) 
  Application Password Management (IT tracking access and passwords) 
 
 
 Security Auditing/Logging/Reporting: 
  Asset Inventory and Valuation 
  Database Change Monitoring/Logging 
  Database Privileged Access Monitoring 
  Appliance/Server Change Monitoring 
  Appliance/Server Privileged Access Monitoring 
  External Penetration Testing 
  Internal Vulnerability Assessment 
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  Digital Forensics 
  Security Information/Event Management 
  Audit Log Review Logging 
 
 
 Security Administrative Controls: 
  Compliance Management 
  Business Continuity (Alternate Productivity Solutions) 
  Disaster Recovery (Vendor/Equipment Replacement Plan) 
  Policy and Standards Documentation 
  Configuration Management 
  Change Management 
  Technical Security Education 
  Security Awareness Training 
  Internal Awareness of Configuration/Availability/Security Changes 
 
 
 Physical Security: 
  Temperature Management (Heat/Cold) 
  Movement (vibration, collapse) 
  Power (Surge, Outage) 
  Fire Suppression 
  Locks 
  Emergency Lighting (Flashlights/Wall Lighting/Exit lighting) 
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APPENDIX D 
Strategic Communications 1 
 
Goal of the Communications Initiative: 
-------------------------------------- 
Influence the perception of the department to firm clients and other audiences through the 
use of communication techniques.  Conversely, the initiative should defend 
organizational personnel and processes from undue negative communications. 
 
 Clients establish their personal beliefs about the department with the information 
by which the department portrays itself.  Individuals have amazing control over that 
information.  Staff may choose what information is communicated and how it is 
communicated to the firm about the department.  Moving forward, the department should 
define the specific objectives of communications and time-line the communications.  
Specifically answering the question, “What action does our team wish to illicit?”  When 
choosing the topics and content of the information, the target audience of the 
communication is essential to the mode and type of communication.  If one is 
communicating within the scope of an individual user (micro-communications) there may 
be a different tactic than a communication directed to a group (mezzo-communications) 
or the entire firm (macro-communications).  Time must also be taken to identify the 
methods that are available for each subset of information to be delivered. 
 
There are a number of possible outcomes from our communications. 
 
 We can choose to: 
 ----------------- 
1) Be silent, in which case the clients will invent information. 
2) Only communicate errors, in which case the clients may feel the firm is inept. 
3) Communicate only the workload, in which case the clients may feel that the 
firm is inefficient or sluggish. 
4) Communicate only success, in which case the clients may feel encouraged, or 
conversely,  misrepresented in their personal support requests. 
5) Communicate goals and challenges alike, in which case the clients may feel 
encouraged and develop a sense of expectation. 
 
 
This week’s tasks: 
------------------ 
1) Establish the goal of firm communications for the intended audience. 
- What image is the firm  hoping to instill in the client community? 






Scope:  Mezzo-Communications (Portland Office) 
Objective: Achieve 4 out of 5 stars in customer satisfaction surveys by 
Q4,2010. 
Methods: Weekly reports, IT Newsletter, Quarterly branch teleconferences 
etcetera... 
 
2) Enumerate the methods available for communication. 




 Branch Meetings 
 Follow-up phone calls and emails 
 Quarterly Teleconferences 
 Newsletters 
















 Firm’s Best Interest in Mind 
 
Specific Objectives 











 Every Quarter = Survey 
 Every Month = Security Update (automatic) 
 
Measures of Effectiveness 
 Survey 
 “Currently, around 78% of the firm believes that the IT Department is doing a 
good job.  This is encouraging, but we would like to do a much better job serving you.  
Please let us know what we are doing right so that we can reinforce the proper attitude 
and support your most important business objectives.”  
 
Measures of Performance 
 How many phone calls were made 
 Who was called 
 How many email were sent 
 How many fliers were disseminated 
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APPENDIX F 
Roles and Responsibilities 
 
Roles and Responsibilities 
 We all play a critical role in the security of the enterprise. Firewalls cannot 
mitigate against careless people, bad processes, or physical vulnerabilities. 
 
Branch Personnel 
 Each department is responsible for the development and implementation of 
information security policies and procedures. They are responsible for keeping 
employees informed of information security programs and conscious of the importance of 
protecting company-sensitive information. Each unit should report security violations, 
concerns, or policy changes within their respective unit to the CISO promptly. 
 
Senior Management 
 The senior leadership is ultimately responsible for organizational security. Only 
the senior leadership may choose to ignore or accept known violations to security best 
practices. Senior Management is responsible for setting the tone surrounding the 
importance of firm security. The Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) is 
responsible for recommending information security policy and procedures, administration 
of the company-wide Information Security Program, and overseeing compliance by 
company departments. The CISO is responsible for business procedures, technical 




 All third-party staff should know and agree to adhere to our firm operating 
policies and procedures. They should take measures to protect the organization’s 
information assets within their own systems, as required by the firm policy and regulatory 
standards. They must report security violations, concerns, or policy changes within their 
respective unit to the organizational representative promptly. 
 
Information Technology (IT) 
 The Information Technology staff should research, communicate, and update 
policies as they apply to their unit. They should maintain personnel and organizational 
records or assets in accordance with classification and regulatory policies. Even though 
IT is the custodian for much of the firm, data access privileges, auditing, and the 
classification of document sensitivity is the responsibility of the data owners. IT should 
provide business continuity and recovery for critical technical systems. IT should report 










I Administrative Controls 
II Technical Controls 
III Physical Controls 
 
I   Administrative Controls 
 Regulatory Compliance Assessment 
 Social Engineering 
 Policy Review 
 Risk assessment and treatment 
 Security policy 
 Organization of information security 
 Asset management 
 Human resources security 
 Information systems acquisition, development and maintenance 
 Information security incident management 
 Business continuity management 
 
II  Technical Controls 
 Threat Profiling 
 Network Reconnaissance 
 Host Protection 
 Application Protection 
 Internet Services Protection 
 Vulnerability Scanning 
 VoIP and Phone Exploitation 
 Wireless Networks 
 Communications and operations management 
 Access control 
 Business continuity management 
 
III Physical Controls 
 Physical and environmental security 
 Access control 
 Fire Suppression 
 Lighting 
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